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DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT:
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO HIV IN U.S.
PRISONS
Kari Larsen
At the end of 2003, 22,028 state inmates and 1631 federal inmates
were known to be infected with HIV. l The HIV-positive inmates, a total of
23,659, accounted for 1.1% of all federal inmates and 2.0% of state inmates,
or 1.9% of the entire prison population in the United States. 2 Several states
had exceedingly high percentages of HIV-positive inmates. For example,
7.6% of state prisoners in New York and 4.2% of state prisoners in
Maryland were confirmed to be HIV positive. 3 Moreover, the number of
confirmed AIDS cases was more than three times higher among state and
federal prisoners than in the general population of the United States.
Although the total number of HIV-positive inmates in 2003 decreased from
the 23,864 recorded in 2002, 5 this decrease reflects the deaths of 282
prisoners who succumbed to AIDS related causes during 2003.6 Taking
these deaths into account, it is apparent that United States prison systems
recognized 359 new cases of HIV in 2003. It is unclear whether these 359
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1. Laura M. Maruschak, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HIV in Prisons, 2003, at 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Maruschak, HIV in Prisons, 2003].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1-2.
4. Id. at 1, 5.
5. Laura M. Maruschak, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HIV in Prisons and Jails, 2002, at 1
(2004) [hereinafter Maruschak, HIV in Prisons, 2002].
6. See Maruschak, HIV in Prisons, 2003, supra note 1, at 1.
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new infections were acquired by the inmates before they were taken into
custody, or while they were incarcerated.
As a consequence of these formidable statistics, corrections officials have
been faced with protecting the constitutional rights of HIV-positive
prisoners, while at the same time protecting the other inmates from exposure
to the virus. This is particularly difficult in an environment where behaviors
known to spread the virus, particularly intravenous drug use and sex, are
commonplace, even though prohibited. Exact statistics regarding intraprison
transmission are difficult to ascertain, because most statistics include a
combination of inmates who were infected prior to entering the system as
well as persons infected while inside the system.7 However, the spread of
HIV in prison has been documented in the United States, as well as abroad,9
and it is recognized as a grave concern. 0
The difficulties faced by correctional administrators in containing the
virus are intensified by the fact that the federal government, through its
health agencies, has not established a national policy addressing HIV
prevention in prison. The absence of a national policy to prevent HIV
transmission in prison has led to a public health crisis, exacerbated by the
federal courts' reluctance to interfere with the policies and practices of
prison administrators, even when confronted with claims that correctional
officials' approaches to HIV care and prevention violate the constitutional
rights of prisoners.
The first part of this article will discuss HIV and its transmission in
prison, the lack of a national policy to prevent transmission among prisoners,
and the federal recommendations that are systematically ignored by prison
administrations. The second part of the article will address the practice of
segregating HIV-positive prisoners and how this may compromise the
constitutional rights of privacy and due process. The last part of the article
focuses on the Eighth Amendment and suggests that the distribution of
7. WHO, Policy Brief: Reduction of HIV Transmission in Prisons (2004),
http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/6BD7C65 1-11 AO-46CB-AAC5-
2BE2C348555 I /0/transmissionprisonen.pdf
8. See T.F. Brewer, D. Vlahov, E. Taylor, D. Hall, A. Munoz & B.F. Polk,
Transmission of HIV-I Within a Statewide Prison System, 2 AIDS 363 (1988).
9. See, e.g., Avril Taylor, et al., Outbreak of HIV Infection in a Scottish Prison, 310
BMJ 289 (1995); Avril Taylor & David Goldberg, Outbreak of HIV in a Scottish Prison:
Why Did It Happen?, HIV/AIDS Pol'y & L. Rev., Apr. 1996, at 13.
10. See RalfJuirgens, Alarming Evidence of HIV Transmission in Prisons, HIV/AIDS
Pol'y & L. Rev., Jan. 1995, at 2.
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prophylactic devices, such as condoms and sterile needles, is required under
the Eighth Amendment to prevent the transmission of HIV among prisoners.
1. AIDS, HIV AND TRANSMISSION
The first known case of HIV-1 in a human was found in a blood sample
collected in 1959 from a man in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I HIV-
I has since become the predominant strain of HIV in the developed world.
2
However, scientists were not aware of the significance of HIV until 1984,
when it was determined that HIV is the virus that causes AIDS.
AIDS first appeared in the United States in the late 1970s, when doctors in
Los Angeles and New York began to report rare types of pneumonia, cancer,
and other illnesses occurring mainly in male patients who had had sex with
other men. '3 In 1982, health officials began to use the term Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome to describe the occurrences of opportunistic
infections, Kaposi 's sarcoma, and Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia in
previously healthy people. 14 In 1984, scientists identified the virus that
causes AIDS, but it was not given the name HIV until 1986.15
Although it is not known with certainty how HIV originated, the most
widely accepted theory among scientists has been that HIV originated in
other primates. In 1999, this theory was substantiated when an international
team of researchers identified a subspecies of chimpanzees native to western
Africa as the original source of the virus. 16 The researchers, led by Dr.
Beatrice H. Hahn, of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, concluded
that HIV-I was first transmitted to the human population when hunters
1I. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,





15. See Nat'l lnsts. of Health, In Their Own Words ... NIH Researchers Recall the
Early Years of AIDS, Timeline, 1981-1988, http://aidshistory.nih.gov
/timeline/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
16. News Release, Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of
Health, NIAID-Supported Scientists Discover Origin of HIV-l (Jan. 31, 1999),
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/I999/hivorigin.htm.
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engaged in the bushmeat trade-the hunting and killing of chimpanzees for
human consumption-were exposed to the chimpanzees' infected blood.,
7
HIV is categorized as a lentivirus, or "slow" virus, which means that there
is generally a long period of time between initial infection and the
emergence of serious symptoms. Once inside the body, HIV causes a
gradual deterioration of the immune system by attacking and destroying a
specific type of blood cell called CD4 positive (CD4+) T cells, which are
blood cells that are critical to the normal function of the human immune
system.1 9 As vital CD4+ cells are destroyed by HIV, the body's ability to
fight off foreign bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, and other microbes
decreases dramatically, 20 and the infected person becomes susceptible to
numerous opportunistic infections that would not usually be dangerous to a
person with a healthy immune system. When a person's CD4+ T-cell count
has dropped below 200 per cubic milliliter of blood, he or she is diagnosed
with AIDS, and his or her body will eventually succumb to one of these
opportunistic infections.
21
HIV is spread through sexual contact with an infected victim, sharing
needles or syringes with an infected victim, receiving blood transfusions,
childbirth, and breast feeding.22 Anal sex is regarded as the riskiest type of
sexual contact because the lining of the rectum is thin and may allow the
17. Id.
18. Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat'l Insts. of Health, How HIV
Causes AIDS (Nov. 2004), http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/howhiv.htm.
19. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
How Does HIV Cause AIDS?, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/faq/hivaids.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2008).
20. Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
HIV and Its Transmission 1 (1999),
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/PDF/transmission.pdf.
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virus to enter the body more easily.23 Nonetheless, correct use of a latex
condom greatly reduces a person's risk of contracting HIV during sex.24
11. THE PERILS OF PRISON
A. Rape
In 1974, the rape of fellow inmates was characterized as the "most closely
guarded secret activity of America's prisons." 25 During the thirty years
since that characterization, the brutality and frequency of rape in prison have
been well documented in civil actions brought by victimized inmates, 2 law
review articles, 2 7 journals 2 8 newspaper articles,2 television programs, 30 and
23. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Can I Get HIV from Anal Sex?, http://www.cdc.govIhiv/resources/qa/qa22.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2008).
24. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
MALE LATEX CONDOMS AND SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 1 (2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/condoms.pdf.
25. CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMES FRIAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS: HOMOSEXUAL RAPE
AND WHY SOCIETY CONDONES IT, at x (The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1974).
26. See, e.g., City of Waco v. Hester, 805 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. App. 1990);
Mitchell v. Elrod, 1104 N.E.2d 1104, 1105 (Il. App. Ct. 1995); Harrison v. Ohio Dep't
of Rehab. & Corr., 695 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997).
27. See James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court
and Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433 (2003); Richard D. Vetstein, Note,
Rape and AIDS in Prison, A Collision Course to a New Death Penalty, 30 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 863 (1997).
28. See Tom Cahill, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Rape in Prison, 9
VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 8 (1984); J.W. Wiggs, Letter, Prison Rape and Suicide, 262
JAMA 3403 (1989); Norman E. Smith & Mary E. Batiuk, Sexual Victimization and
Inmate Social Interaction, PRISON J., Oct. 1989, at 29; Human Rights Watch, No ESCAPE:
MALE RAPE IN PRISON (2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html.
29. See Tamar Lewin, Little Sympathy or Remedy for Inmates Who Are Raped, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 15, 2001, § 1, at 1; Charles M. Sennott, Prison's Hidden Horror: Rape
Behind Bars, Boston Globe, May 1, 1994, Metro/Region, at 1; Gary Marx, Lonely
Mission: Stephen Donaldson Wants to Stop the Sexual Abuse of Inmates by Inmates, Chi.
Trib., June 23, 1995, Tempo, at 1.
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court testimony. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the
prevalence of rape in jail. In 1980, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote "a
youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang rape his first
night in jail or ... even in the van on the way to jail.",
31
One commentator has attributed the prevalence of rape in prison to the
phenomenon of sexual terrorism, through which dominant inmates frighten
weaker inmates as a means of controlling them. The prison environment
fosters sexual attacks by "equating manhood with domination and femininity
with subservience." 33 Consequently, inmates rape others as a means of
demonstrating their masculinity in a world devoid of what is typically
associated with manliness. 34 For example, an all male populationyrecludes
the possibility of validation through female sexual partners, and the
intrusive rules restricting inmate conduct deprive men of their autonomy,
which is also associated with masculinity. 6 Additionally, the forfeiture of
most material items enjoyed in freedom denies inmates the affirmation of
self through property ownership.
37
The victims of prison rape are socially reconstructed, becoming female in
the eyes of the other inmates.38 In accordance with this premise, victims of
sexual assault are often called female names and terms indicative of gender
30. 60 Minutes: Profile: Prison Rape; Gang Rape Victims Advocate More Protection
for Inmates (CBS television broadcast Mar. 3, 1996).
31. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Robertson, supra note 27, at 440.
33. Id. (citing Lee H. Bowker, Victimizers and Victims in American Correctional
Institutions, The Pains of Imprisonment 63, 64 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., Sage
Publications 1982)).
34. Id. (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000)).
35. Id. at 441 (citing Gresham M. Sykes, The Society of Captives 71-72 (Princeton
University Press 1958)).
36. Id. (citing Sykes, supra note 35, at 76).
37. Robertson, supra note 27, at 441 (citing Sykes, supra note 35, at 69).
38. Id. at 440 (citing Human Rights Watch, supra note 28).
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animus such as "bitch" and "pussy" during and after the assault.39 The
victims of prison rape suffer from numerous nightmares, deep depression,
shame, loss of self-esteem, and self-hatred, and they often consider or
attempt suicide.40 They are also at risk of being exposed to HIV and other
sexually transmitted diseases. The risk of exposure to HIV is heightened
when an inmate is raped, as the violent nature of the attack frequently causes
severe rectal bleeding, 41 which increases the likelihood of transmission.
When numerous assailants participate, the chances of infection are further
increased.4 2
It has been estimated that out of the forty-six million Americans who will
enter the criminal justice system, ten million will be raped while in
custody.43 Other studies have shown that as many as "22.3% of respondent
inmates had been pressured or forced into sex." '4 4 Another estimate projects
that approximately 360,000 male inmates are victims of sexual assaults
every year.
45
Accurate statistics are not available because of the reluctance of inmates
to report rapes. Most victims do not report that they have been raped out of
46embarrassment, shame, or fear of retaliation. An inmate "who snitches or
rats . . . violates a strict prison code, subjecting them to severe and violent
retribution by the entire inmate community."'4 If the victim is labeled an
48"informer" he may even be murdered for reporting his attacker. Rather
39. Id. (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000)).
40. Id. at 441-42 (quoting Human Rights Watch, supra note 28).
41. David M. Siegal, Note, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth
Amendment Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1541, 1549 (1992).
42. Id.
43. Vetstein, supra note 27, at 863 (citing Weiss & Friar, supra note 25, at 61).
44. Id. at 870 (citing Fred Bruning, Prison Studies Are Few, but Point to 'Targets' of
SexualAssault, Seattle Times, Apr. 23, 1995, at A 16).
45. Id.
46. Robertson, supra note 27, at 443-44.
47. Vetstein, supra note 27, at 871.
48. Id
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than risk retaliation for reporting a rape, many victims or "punks" will seek
protection by forming a sexual relationship with a strong or feared prisoner
in exchange for their protection from being raped by other inmates.49 This
ongoing, coerced sexual relationship may be the only way for the inmate to
avoid being repeatedly raped or retaliated against for reporting a sexual
assault. These relationships blur the distinction between coerced and
consensual sex, and make it even more difficult to ascertain the number of
prisoners who are victims of coerced sexual intercourse while in custody.
One expert has projected that the actual number of prison rapes "may be five
or six times greater than the number of reported sexual assaults."
50
B. Consensual Sex
Several different studies have estimated that the proportion of inmates
engaging in consensual sexual intercourse can be as high as 65% in a
California prison,5' or as low as 2%.52 Other studies have estimated that
30% of inmates engage in consensual homosexual intercourse. 53 Although it
is difficult to ascertain exact statistics as to how prevalent consensual sex is
in prison, it is clear that most of this sexual contact is unsafe, as the vast
majority of prisoners do not have access to latex condoms, the most effective
protection against transmission of HIV. 96% of state prison systems
consider condoms to be contraband, and do not allow them inside facilities.54
49. Id.
50. Id. at 870.
51. Christopher P. Krebs, High Risk HIV Transmission Behavior in Prison and the
Prison Subculture, 82 Prison J. 19, 20 (2002) (citing Wayne S. Wooden & Jay Parker,
Men Behind Bars: Sexual Exploitation in Prison (Da Capo Press 1982)).
52. Id. (citing C. Saum, H. Surratt, J. Inciardi & R. Bennet, Sex in Prison: Exploring
Myths and Realities, 75 Prison J. 413 (1995)).
53. Id. (citing Peter L. Nacci & Thomas R. Kane, The Incidence of Sex and Sexual
Aggression in Federal Prison, Fed. Probation, Dec. 1983, at 31).
54. Id. (citing Theodore M. Hammett, Patricia Harmon & Laura M. Maruschak, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 1996-1997 Update: HlV/AIDS, STDs and TB in Correctional Facilities
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles l/176344.pdf).
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C. Intravenous Drug Use
As with sexual activity, the exact percentage of inmates who use drugs is
difficult to ascertain. The criminal justice system is a "reservoir" for drug
abusers, 55 most of whom continue to use drugs after being placed in
custody.56 "[13 oth visitors and correctional officers supply inmates with
illegal drugs."5  Additionally, inside the prisons, drugs are sold by both the
corrections officials and the inmates. 58 One study has shown that 58% of
surveyed prisoners injected drugs during incarceration.
59
Two prominent theories have emerged with respect to the prevalence of
drug use in prison. The first theory, known as the "deprivation model,"
suggests that drug use inside prison is a response to the "pains of
imprisonment,"' 60 which are "produced by the loss of liberty, goods, and
services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and security." 61 The
adherence to an inmate code of behavior, which includes the abuse of drugs,
helps the inmates neutralize the pains of imprisonment. 62 The second
theory, known as the "importation model," suggests that "the values of the
prison subculture are imported into prison from the outside world.' 6 3 Inmate
55. Wayne Gillespie, A Multilevel Model of Drug Abuse Inside Prison, 85 Prison J.
223, 225 (2005) (citing Carl G. Leukefeld & Frank R.Tims, Drug Abuse Treatment in
Prisons and Jails, 10 J. Substance Abuse Treatment 77 (1993)).
56. Id. (citing Rachel Swann & Pam James, The Effect of the Prison Environment
Upon Inmate Drug Taking Behavior, 37 How. J. Crim. Just. 252 (1998)).
57. Id. at 226.
58. Gillespie, supra note 55, at 226 (citing James A. Inciardi, Dorothy Lockwood &
Judith A. Quinlan, Drug Use in Prison: Patterns, Processes, and Implications for
Treatment, 23 J. Drug Issues 119 (1993)).
59. Id. at 225 (citing A. Edwards, S. Curtis & J. Sherrard, Survey of Risk Behavior
and HIV Prevalence in an English Prison, 10 Int'l J. STD & AIDS 464 (1999)).
60. Krebs, supra note 51, at 23 (citing Sykes, supra note 35).
61. Id. at 23-24 (citing Sykes, supra note 35).
62. Id at 24 (citing Sykes, supra note 35).
63. Id. (citing Clarence Schrag, Leadership Among Prison Inmates, 19 Am. Soc.
Rev. 37 (1954)).
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behavior is "an extension of the behavioral patterns of the inmates prior to
incarceration," 64 as pre-prison characteristics, behaviors, and experiences of
inmates are imported into the prison with the inmate.
65
One study indicates that among inmates who inject drugs, 40% reported
sharing injection equipment with others. 66 Inmates who inject drugs are
likely to share unclean needles because both the needles and bleach, which
can be used to sterilize the needles, are considered contraband and are
therefore difficult to obtain.
67
D. Tattooing
Tattooing is customary in prison, and it continues to occur despite the fact
that the needles used to make the tattoos are often shared and not sterile.
Sterile tattoo needles are difficult to obtain in prison because they are
considered contraband. The shortage of needles leads to the sharing of
needles among inmates, which poses a risk of HIV transmission.68 Although
the CDC has no reports of HIV actually being spread through tattooing, it is
still regarded as a risky behavior in prison. The handmade vibrating tattoo
machines crafted by inmates in prison make multiple incisions, thereby
increasing the risk of transmission.
69
E. Violence
Incidents of interpersonal violence, such as fights among two or more
participants involving lacerations, bites, and bleeding, present risks of HIV
transmission. Although prison authorities strive to prevent violence among
prisoners with adequate staffing, supervision, and programming, the housing
64. Id. (citing John Irwin, The Felon (Prentice Hall 1970)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 21 (citing M.C. Monroe, B.J. Colley-Neimeyer & G.A. Conway, S.C.
Dep't of Corr., Report of Studies of HIV Seroprevalence and AIDS Knowledge,
Attitudes, and Risk Behaviors in Inmates of South Carolina Department of Corrections
(1988)).
67. Id. (citing Nancy Mahon, New York Inmates' HIV Risk Behaviors: The
Implications for Prevention Policies and Programs, 86 Am. J. Pub. Health 1211 (1996)).
68. Id.
69. Elizabeth Kantor, HIV InSite, HIV Transmission and Prevention in Prisons
(2006), http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/insite?page=kb-07-04-13.
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of more than one inmate per cell (common now in crowded institutions) "is a
major contributing factor to incidents of violence and sexual assault."
70
Ill. THE ABSENCE OF A NATIONAL POLICY TO PREVENT HIV IN PRISONS
In March 1991, the National Commission on AIDS "proposed that the
U.S. Public Health Service develop guidelines for the prevention and
treatment of HIV in all U.S. correctional facilities."7'1 Five years later, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended that
education and prevention programs be implemented for inmates in prisons
and jails to assist in reducing the transmission of HIV in the United States.
72
In spite of the Commission's proposal and the CDC's logical deduction that
the transmission of HIV in prisons will lead to the transmission of HIV in
society, formal guidelines regarding the prevention of HIV in correctional
facilities have never been issued by the federal government through the U.S.
Public Health Service (USPHS), the CDC, or any other agency.73 This
omission was reflected in a 1992 study done for the World Health
Organization, which revealed that among nineteen countries surveyed, "the
United States was one of only four that did not have a national policy for
HIV management in prison." 74 That the U.S. remains without such a policy
is appalling, especially in light of the fact that the U.S. has the world's
largest prison population, 75 at 2,258,983." Furthermore, at least one U.S.
70. Id.
71. Id (citing Nat'l Comm'n on AIDS, HIV Disease in Correctional Facilities
(1991)).
72. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIVIAIDS Education and Prevention
Programs for Adults in Prisons and Jails and Juveniles in Confinement Facilities -
United States, 1994, 45 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 268 (1996), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4513.pdf.
73. Telephone Interview with the Office of Nat'l AIDS Policy (Oct. 2005).
74. Kantor, supra note 69 (citing T.W. Harding & G. Schaller, WHO Global
Programme on AIDS, HIV/AIDS and Prisons: Updating and Policy Review. A Survey
Covering 55 Prison Systems in 31 Countries (1992)).
75. See Int'l Ctr. for Prison Studies, Entire World - Prison Population Totals,
http://www.kcl.ac.uk//depsta/rel/icps/worldbrief/highest to lowestrates.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
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federal court has acknowledged that "[h]igh-risk behavior, particularly IV
drug use and homosexual activity... is a given in the prison setting, and no
correctional approach can eliminate it." 77
As the CDC correctly stated, the vast majority of inmates in the United
States are eventually released. Indeed, 95% of inmates are expected to be
released and returned to society,7 8 where they will reunite with their spouses,
sexual partners, friends, and other social contacts. Studies have shown that
within twelve hours of their release, inmates typically "celebrate" their
liberation by engaging in conduct that is prohibited in prison. Typical
celebratory conduct includes high-risk behavior, such as sexual intercourse
or the injection of IV drugs. Heightening the risk of HIV transmission is the
desire for "pure sex" without the use of a condom.
79
The only guidance given by the federal government regarding the
prevention of HIV transmission in prisons appears in several suggestions
made by the CDC and the National Commission of Correctional Healthcare
(NCCHC). The suggestions from the CDC appear in the editorial notes of
three issues of Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Review. In 1991, the editor
acknowledged both the occurrence of transmission within prison settings and
"the need for providing primary and secondary HIV-prevention services to
populations within the U.S. correctional system." 80 Five years later, in 1996,
the editor bemoaned the missed opportunities to provide HIV/AIDS
prevention programs in prisons and jails, and suggested the implementation
of "programs of interactive education, counseling, testing, and practical risk
reduction techniques (e.g. safer sex and safer drug injection)" for inmates.
8 1
76. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prison Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/prisons.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
77. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1520 n.36 (1 1th Cir. 1991).
78. Timothy Hughes & Doris J. Wilson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Reentry Trends in the United States,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/reentry.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
79. T. Morales, C.A. Gomez & B.V. Marin, Freedom and HIV Prevention:
Challenges Facing Latino Inmates Leaving Prison, Presentation at the 103d American
Psychological Association Convention (1995).
80. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Prevention in the U.S. Correctional
System, 1991, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 389 (1992), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00016871 .htm.
81. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,. supra note 72.
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While acknowledging that ten correctional facilities had implemented
counseling, testing, and partner notification, the editor noted that few
systems made available the recommended means to practice risk reduction,
such as condoms or bleach.82
In April 2006, the CDC published a study reporting that between 1992
and 2005, 91% of the HIV-positive prisoners in Georgia's prison system
contracted the virus outside of prison. 83 Of the 88 inmates who
seroconverted in prison, those available for interviews reported that they had
engaged in at least some type of risky behavior. In spite of the CDC's gentle
suggestion in the editorial note that corrections departments assess the
feasibility and benefits of condom distribution in prisons,84 the Georgia
Corrections Department is reportedly not considering this policy but will use
data from the study to help decide whether to house HIV-positive inmates at
separate facilities.
g5
The NCCHC's suggestions, somewhat stronger and more visible than
those of the CDC, are the subject of a position statement entitled
"Administrative Management of HIV in Correctional Institutions." The
statement, originally published in 1987 and revised in October 2005,
purports to "provide [] guidance to resolve administrative issues by
suggesting common ground for the overarching goals and objectives of an
HIV service delivery system. ' 86 The suggestions in the statement include
screening inmates for HIV on a voluntary basis, integrated housing and
programs, access to quality medical treatment, mental health support,
effective education, and ongoing prevention services. The prevention
services recommended by the statement explicitly include peer education
with materials written in diverse languages and for low reading levels, and
harm reduction techniques such as condom distribution, needle exchange,
82. Id.
83. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Transmission Among Male Inmates
in a State Prison System - Georgia 1992-2005, 55 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep.
421 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5515al.htm.
84. Id.
85. Mike Stobbe, CDC Finds Few Inmates Infected in Prison, Associated Press, Apr.
20, 2006, http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2006/AP060434.html.
86. Nat'l Comm'n on Corr. Health Care, Administrative Management of HIV in
Correctional Institutions (Oct. 9, 2005),
http://ncchc.org/resources/statements/admin-hiv2005.html [hereinafter NCCHC].
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counseling, and availability of bleach tablets. 87 The statement also includes
a disclaimer: "While NCCHC clearly does not condone illegal activity by
inmates, the public health strategy to reduce the risk of contagion is our
primary concern. NCCHC recommends that correctional administrators
implement harm reduction strategies. ' 88 The statement concludes by saying
that, "combining universal precautions with implementation of harm
reduction strategies is the most effective way to address the infection control
issues of HIV within correctional facilities."
89
A. THE IMPOTENCY OF FEDERAL SUGGESTIONS
Ten years after the CDC suggested the use of harm reduction techniques,
U.S. correctional systems continue to turn a blind eye to inmates' risky
behavior and a deaf ear to the recommendations of our principal federal
healthcare agency. The suggestions of the NCCHC, although written more
forcefully and given a more prominent position than those of the CDC, are
also universally ignored.
Federal health agencies suggest that prison administrations ought to
distribute latex condoms to the sexually active populations committed to
their care and custody. Although the United States had 1668 correctional
facilities in 2000, only seven systems have heeded this suggestion.
90
Condoms were distributed to inmates in the homosexual dormitory on New
York's Riker's Island (before it closed in 2006), 91 are distributed to inmates
in the San Francisco County jails, where the condoms are accompanied by




90. James J. Stephan & Jennifer C. Karberg, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Census of State
and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2000, at 1 (2003).
91. Paul Von Zilbauer, City Prepares to Close Rikers Housing for Gays, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 30, 2005, at B9.
92. Kantor, supra note 69.
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systems, 93 and in the state prison in Vermont. 94 In Mississippi, inmates can
purchase condoms from vending machines.
95
Currently, a bill (AB 1677) regarding condom distribution within
California prisons is pending in the California State Assembly. If enacted,
AB 1677 would allow not-for-profit organizations to distribute sexual barrier
protection devices, such as condoms or dental dams, to inmates. Included in
the bill is a disclaimer of sorts; a caveat to the reader that "the distribution of
these devices shall not ... be deemed to encourage sexual acts between
inmates."
96
Most U.S. prison systems refuse to distribute condoms for fear that 1) the
condoms would be filled up with sand or dirt and used as weapons; 2) that
the condoms would be used to hide contraband; and 3) that the distribution
of condoms would implicitly suggest that sex is permitted. 
97
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) recommends the distribution of condoms to all
prisoners. 9 8 In keeping with this recommendation, 81% of prison systems in
Europe provide condoms to inmates, 99 as do all Canadian federal prisons,
where there have been no reported incidents of condoms being used as
weapons. 100 However, 10% of Canadian prison guards view condoms as a
nuisance, because prisoners use them as water balloons. 10 1 In spite of the
availability of condoms to Canadian prisoners, sexual conduct in prison
93. Rebecca Neremberg, Spotlight: Condoms in Correctional Settings, HEPP News
(HIV & Hepatitis Educ. Prison Project, Providence, R.I.), Jan. 2002, at 6, available at
http://www.idcronline.org/archives/j an02/jan2002.pdf.
94. Kantor, supra note 69.
95. Id.
96. A.B. 1677, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
97. Neremberg, supra note 93.
98. UNAIDS, Prisons and AIDS: UNAIDS Point of View 6 (1997).
99. Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Prevention: Condoms (2004),
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=710.
100. Neremberg, supra note 93.
101. Kantor, supra note 69.
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remains an institutional offense. When asked if the distribution of condoms
in Canadian prisons implies that sexual activity is permitted, Ralf Jurgens,
director of the Canadian HIV/AIDS legal Network, explained, "Fighting the
spread of HIV is more important than upholding so-called morality when the
activity is occurring (even in the absence of condoms)."
' 02
UNAIDS has commented on the unwillingness of other countries to
distribute condoms in prison:
Unfortunately, there still exists a strong current of denial in many
places about male to male sex (especially in prison) and a
corresponding refusal to do anything which might be seen as
condoning it. These attitudes will have to change if societies want to
see the rate of HIV infection-inside prison and outside of it-
decrease.' 03
Along with the distribution of condoms, United States federal health
agencies and UNAIDS recommend distribution of sterile injection
equipment or bleach kits to prisoners who inject intravenous drugs. The
benefits of a prison needle exchange program were demonstrated by a 1994
pilot project in Switzerland. The Hindelbank project performed a one-year
study on the effects of a needle exchange program in a women's prison.'
°4
The study was a success, as there was no transmission of HIV or viral
hepatitis, there was no increase in drug use, needles were not used as
weapons, and fewer abscesses occurred among inmates.' 0 5 In spite of the
results of this well-known study, only two correctional systems in the United
States distribute bleach kits, and none distribute sterile needles. 106 The
virtual nonexistence of simple, inexpensive measures needed to prevent the
transmission of HIV in prison is a testament to the impotence of federal
suggestions made by the federal government.
While federal recommendations for effective education have not been
completely disregarded by prison administrators, education provided to
inmates about HIV prevention is often woefully inadequate. Many
educational programs for prisoners do not meet the needs of the inmate
102. Neremberg, supra note 93, at 6.
103. UNAIDS, supra note 98, at 6-7.
104. J. Nelles, A. Fuhrer, H.P. Hirsbrunner & T.W. Harding, Provision of Syringes:
The Cutting Edge of Harm Reduction in Prison? 317 BMJ 270, 270-71 (1998).
105. Kantor, supra note 69.
106. Id.
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population. As many as 50% of U.S. prisoners are functionally illiterate,
and many inmates are not native English speakers. 0 7 Consequently, most of
the available literature about HIV and AIDS is beyond their
comprehension. 108 In order to be effective, educational programs for
prisoners must take into consideration the abilities of the prisoners, and
brought to a level that all inmates can understand, even those who cannot
read or understand English. Compounding the ineffectiveness of many
prison educational programs is the fact that they give instructions regarding
the use of condoms or sterilization of needles, 109 even though prison
administrations refuse to allow prisoners access to these methods of
protection. This practice has been characterized as "ironic and sad" by at
least one commentator."
0
The AIDS pandemic continues to proliferate in the United States, despite
the availability of education and prevention measures. During the past nine
years, more than one million people in the United States have died from
AIDS-related causes,]1 1 and it is estimated that an additional 462,792 are
currently living with HIV or AIDS.' 12 It is also estimated that 20 to 26% of
the people living with HIV/AIDS in the United States have spent time in
U.S. correctional facilities." 3 These figures call for dramatic changes in the
way that HIV prevention is addressed in U.S. prisons.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mark Parts, The Eighth Amendment and the Requirement of Active Measures to
Prevent the Spread of AIDS in Prisons, 22 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 217, 227-28
(1991).
110. Id. at 227.
111. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report (1997); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report (1999); Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HIV/AIDS
Surveillance Report (2004).
112. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 7 (2004).
113. Kantor, supra note 69 (citing Theodore M. Hammett, Patricia Harmon &
William Rhodes, The Burden of Infectious Disease Among Inmates and Releasees from
Correctional Facilities, in 2 The Health Status of Soon-to-Be-Released Inmates: A
Report to Congress 13 (Nat'l Comm'n on Corr. Health Care ed., 2002)).
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The opinions written by federal health agencies that prison administrators
ought to implement effective education and risk reduction techniques to
hinder the spread of HIV have failed to motivate correctional administrators
to do so. Correctional administrators are formidably powerful,
incongruously so, as they control the dissemination of information about
HIV to more than two million inmates, as well as their access to sterile
needles, bleach, and barrier protection from the virus. Prison officials have a
significant opportunity to decrease the rate of HIV transmission in their
communities, thereby decreasing the incidence of HIV transmission in
society. Their refusal to employ this opportunity makes it clear that their
amount of discretion should be reduced, and federal suggestions must
immediately be replaced with compulsory federal directives regarding the
prevention of HIV in prison. Additionally, federal courts must take a more
assertive approach in their oversight of prison conditions and compel prison
administrators to provide inmates with the effective education and harm
reduction techniques contemplated by the federal health agencies. A
progressive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment would effectively
compel lower courts to take a proactive approach to HIV prevention in
prison and mandate the distribution of prophylactic devices to inmates.
B. The Segregation of Prisoners
In the early days of the AIDS pandemic, many state prison systems
implemented policies of segregating their HIV-positive populations as a
means of preventing the spread of the virus. In 1985, thirty-eight state
prison systems segregated all inmates with HIV. 114 By 2001, the trend had
changed, and many systems had moved away from the practice of
segregation, in part due to the heightened understanding about transmission
of the virus and the belief that isolation was not medically necessary.
Currently, the practice of segregation is not widely accepted as a sensible
strategy because it contributes to the stigmatization of HIV-positive people,
presents numerous logistical problems, and results in a costly duplication of
services that is not medically necessary. 115 Segregation has also been
114. Press Release, ACLU, Court Order Ends Discrimination Against HIV+ Prisoners
in Mississippi, ACLU Welcomes Hard Fought Reform (June 17, 2004),
http://www.aclu.org/prison/medicalU14779prs2004067.html.
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criticized as being an ineffective means of containing the virus. The
isolation of HIV-positive inmates leads to misconceptions among the general
inmate population that they are safe from exposure to the virus. These
feelings of safety may lead to an increase of high-risk behavior among
prisoners who are categorized as seronegative. However, some prisoners
who are deemed seronegative may actually be HIV positive due to the
occurrence of false negative tests, the incomplete testing of prison
populations, and the "window" period between infection and the production
of antibodies that can be detected on standard HIV antibody tests." 6 The
misplacement of HIV-positive inmates in a segregated system creates a more
dangerous situation than an integrated system, where inmates are more
aware of the possibility of exposure to the virus if they engage in high-risk
behavior with other inmates.
Despite the widespread opinion that segregation of HIV-positive inmates
is unnecessary, impractical, and ineffective, a number of prison systems in
the United States remain segregated. State prison systems in Alabama,
Mississippi, and South Carolina mandate complete segregation of housing
for all HIV-positive inmates, and at least nine other systems-Alaska,
Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Utah, Virginia,
and Wisconsin-segregate HIV-positive prisoners according to a case-by-
case determination.
C. The Reality of a Segregated Prison System
The most notorious of the blanket segregation policies based upon HIV
status were those implemented in the Alabama state correctional system in
1987 and the Mississippi state correctional system in 1991. Both systems
have been the focus of the ACLU's National Prison Project for many years.
The harsh conditions faced by Alabama prisoners segregated because of
their HIV-positive status are documented in the case of Onishea v.Hopper 118 and in several articles published in the New York Times.1 19 Since
116. Rachel Maddow, Nat'l Minority Aids Council, Pushing for Progress: HIV/AIDS
in Prisons 18 (2002).
117. See Criminal Justice Inst., The 2002 Corrections Yearbook: Adult Corrections 57
(Camille Graham Camp ed., Criminal Justice Institute 2003).
118. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Davis
v. Hopper, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).
119. Adam Liptak, Alabama Prison at Center of Suit over AIDS Policy, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 2003; Paul Von Zielbauer, A Company's Troubled Answer for Prisoners with
H.I. V, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2005, at Al.
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1987, when its segregation policy began, the Alabama Department of
Corrections has tested all prisoners in its custody for HIV. Male prisoners
whose test results are positive are sent to the Limestone Correctional Facility
in Harvest, Alabama, and female inmates whose test results are positive are
sent to the Julia Tutweiler Correctional Facility, in Wetumpka, Alabama.
In Onishea v. Hopper, 12°a group of segregated prisoners brought an
action against the Alabama Department of Corrections, claiming that their
segregation based upon HIV status violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, which prohibits the exclusion of otherwise qualified individuals
from participation in any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. 12 1 After describing in detail the negative impact that segregation
had on the prisoners, as well as the alleged benefits of segregation, the
Eleventh Circuit denied the plaintiff prisoners' claim. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari without rendering an opinion.
According to the plaintiff prisoners, from 1987 until 2005, the prison
administration would not permit HIV-positive prisoners to participate in
"Double 0" squad jobs maintaining the prison grounds, jobs on
the prison farm, bus squad jobs, facility maintenance jobs, trash
detail jobs, kitchen jobs, runner jobs, upholstery classes, electrical
technology classes, auto mechanics classes, construction trade
classes, automotive body repair classes, horticulture classes,
welding classes, staff barber jobs, inmate barber jobs, laundry
jobs, gardening jobs in the prison's vegetable gardens, the "Free
by Choice" program (in which prisoners go to schools to talk to
pupils about substance abuse and criminality), basketball and
baseball tournaments, and 'Alabama Volunteers in Corrections'
meetings (to prepare prisoners for release). 
122
The only programs accessible to HIV-positive inmates were "paralegal
training classes (HIV-positive inmates see videotapes of live instruction),
adult basic education, GED testing, Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings, graduation ceremonies, drafting classes, haircuts, visitation,
medical treatment, gymnasium and library time, chapel services, dining, and
prisoner transportation."'
23
120. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1292.
121. 29U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
122. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1292.
123. Id. at 1293.
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Inside Limestone, HIV-positive inmates were housed in a drafty, rat-
infested warehouse from 1999 to 2003.124 This crowded setting with its
"open plan" was ideal for the spread of infectious diseases, and coupled with
the notoriously poor medical care provided at the prison, contributed to the
deterioration of the health of many HIV-positive inmates. The death of
thirty-six inmates between 1999 and 2002,125 more than twice the national
prison average, 126 provoked a Miami attorney, David Lipman, to file a
lawsuit on behalf of the HIV-positive prisoners in 2002. The complaint
alleged that the inadequate medical care and living conditions endured by
HIV-positive inmates at Limestone violated their rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 128 One year after the lawsuit was filed, the
Alabama Department of Corrections replaced its local healthcare provider,
Naphcare, with Prison Health Services, the nation's largest provider of
prison healthcare. 129 Housing for segregated inmates was also changed,
from the open warehouse plan to "dormitories" that consisted of customary
cellblocks, each housing two inmates. 130 These changes were likely made in
response to the negative publicity created by the lawsuit, or in anticipation of
the terms of the settlement agreement, which was approved by the court in
June 2004.131 The terms of the settlement agreement promised continued
improvements to living conditions and medical care for HIV-positive
inmates, as well as the appointment of a court monitor to make monthly
assessments of living conditions and medical care at the prison. 132
124. See Von Zielbauer, supra note 119.
125. Id.
126. Maruschak, supra note 5, at 1.
127. Complaint, Leatherwood v. Haley, No. CV-02-BE-2812-W (N.D. Ala. filed Nov.
18, 2002).
128. Id.
129. Von Zielbauer, supra note 119.
130. Liptak, supra note 120.
131. Von Zielbauer, supra note 119.
132. Id.
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Although positive changes were promised to Alabama's HIV-positive
inmates in the settlement agreement, the conditions and medical care at
Limestone Correctional Facility remain inadequate. In August 2005, a front-
page article in the New York Times covered the grim circumstances of
incarceration at Limestone. 133 The article documented the absence of a
clerical staff, an incompetent nursing staff, and shortages of supplies such as
soap, paper towels, and thermometers.
134 It also described a rat-infested
HIV unit, "where broken windows had been replaced with plastic sheeting
that was itself falling apart [and there were] thousands of doses of prescribed
medications [that] had never been given, as far as the [court] monitor could
tell from the slapdash records."
'1 35
In January 2004, the Alabama Department of Corrections announced the
integration of prison programs for their HIV-positive prisoners housed at
Limestone Correctional Facility. 136 While these prisoners are still placed in
housing that is segregated from the general population, they are allowed
access to the prison's trade school and vocational programs, and are allowed
to work at some, but not all, jobs within the prison camp.
137 In spite of the
increased accessibility of programs to HIV-positive inmates at Limestone,
HIV-positive women housed at Alabama's Julia Tutweiler Correctional
Facility are still denied access to numerous programs. Because of their HIV
status, they are ineligible to participate in
data processing classes, clerical classes, cosmetology classes,
sewing classes, building trades classes, automotive repair classes,
welding classes, floral design classes, small business machine
repair classes, quantity foods service classes, nutrition classes,
concerts and talent shows, softball and volleyball games, the "Free
by Choice" program, college classes, literacy training, sewing
factory jobs, data processing jobs, "downtown" jobs for
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kitchen jobs, yard jobs, maintenance jobs, housekeeping jobs,
laundry jobs, trash jobs, runner jobs, and haircutting jobs.
38
They are, however, able to access certain programs separately from the
general population. For example, "chapel services, some rehabilitation
programs such as substance abuse and stress management counseling,
visitation, organized recreational activities such as May Day and
Oktoberfest, dining, medical care, adult basic education, GED testing,
library use, and prisoner transportation" are all accessible to segregated
inmates at Julia Tutweiler.1
39
Mississippi's Department of Corrections also segregates its HIV-positive
inmates from the general prison population. 140 Since 1990, Mississippi has
screened all inmates for H1V, housing all male inmates who test positive for
the virus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. 14 1
All women who are in the custody of Mississippi's Department of
Corrections are housed at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in
Rankin County, Mississippi. 142 From 1990 to 2001, the segregation of
Mississippi's HIV-positive prisoners rendered them ineligible to participate
in the educational and vocational programs that typically reduce sentences
and increase the likelihood of employment upon release.
14I
The ACLU began working with Mississippi's segregated prisoners in
1998, lobbying for equal access to programs, better medical care, and
improvement of their dangerous living conditions, which included rats and
vermin, human feces and extreme heat. 144 At the urging of a coalition
formed by the ACLU, local activists, and inmates' families, Mississippi
138. Onisheav. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1293 (1999).
139. Id
140. Miss. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Insts. State Prisons,
http://www.mdoc.state.ms.us/division of institutions%20State%20Prisons.htm (last
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Department of Corrections (Mississippi DOC) commissioner Robert L.
Johnson appointed a state HIV/AIDS Inmate Program Access task force in
2000. 145 One year later, the commissioner announced that he would
implement the task force's recommendations, including the gradual
integration of inmates with HIV into vocational and educational
programs. 46 Although regarded as a "huge step forward" 
by the ACLU, 1
47
the gradual integration of HIV-positive inmates did not include integration
into Mississippi's Community Corrections Program. In 2004, during the
course of a lawsuit brought by the ACLU on behalf of Mississippi's HIV-
positive prisoners,148 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi issued an injunction ordering the Mississippi
Department of Corrections to allow HIV-positive inmates to participate in
the Community Corrections program, claiming this would help rehabilitate
the prisoners and potentially shorten their sentences. The injunction was a
result of negotiations between the parties, rather than a finding that the
policies of the Mississippi DOC violated the rights of the prisoners under the
U.S. Constitution or the Rehabilitation Act. In April 2005, Magistrate
Judge Jerry Davis issued an order to remove the injunction, recognizing the
improvements made in the treatment of Mississippi's HIV-positive
prisoners. 150 However, litigation continues in Mississippi, with a 2005
lawsuit brought by the ACLU regarding overcrowded living conditions, and
inadequate medical care for HIV-positive prisoners.
1 51 Specifically, the suit
alleges that the overcrowded living conditions, inadequate sanitation
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outbreak of a drug-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, which the staff failed to
contain.'
52
D. Seroconversion Rates in Integrated and Segregated Prisons
In Onishea v. Hopper, 153 a group of HIV-positive prisoners sued the
Alabama Department of Corrections, claiming their rights under the
Rehabilitation Act 154 were violated by the department's policy of
segregating HIV-positive inmates and denying their access to numerous
prison programs. Each party presented evidence regarding the risk of HIV
transmission in prison and during participation in prison programs. The
prisoners presented expert testimony establishing that incidents of HIV
transmission during many types of activities in prison are rare or virtually
unknown. In fact, "at the time of trial there were no reported cases of
transmission as a result of lesbian sex, sports injuries, stabbing, or
tattooing."' 155 Only "sporadic" instances of transmission had been reported
from oral sex and fistfights.
156
In support of their position that integration would not put the general
prison population at risk, the plaintiffs presented evidence that anal sex and
needle sharing, although high-risk activities, were uncommon in the
programs to which they sought access. The plaintiffs' rationale was that the
rarity or absence of these high-risk activities in the past indicated that the
behaviors would be unlikely to occur in the future. The plaintiffs also
showed that because the programs at issue are in high demand, inmates
would be unlikely to violate prison rules and risk being removed from the
programs by engaging in the prohibited conduct. Additionally, the degree of
supervision in most programs makes the occurrence of high-risk behavior
implausible.
The defendants, on the other hand, introduced testimony that HIV
transmission is possible whenever there is an exchange of blood between an
infected person and an uninfected one. The defendants also introduced
evidence that high-risk activities are widespread in prison. This evidence
included "a six-inch high stack of incident reports from the past few years
152. Presley v. Epps, No. 4:05CVI48-M-B (N.D. Miss. filed June 22, 2005).
153. Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 1999).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
155. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1293.
156. Id. at 1293-94.
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describing hidden hypodermic needles, homosexual acts, and bloody
fights." ''1 7 Additionally, the defendants presented evidence that a 1991
outbreak of syphilis, wherein eighty-six HIV-positive inmates were infected,
originated from a single inmate. Finally, the defendants offered evidence
that "integrated prison systems in Maryland, Nevada, and Illinois have
experienced seroconversions at annual rates of 0.41%, 0.19%, and 0.33%,
respectively." Alabama, by contrast, had an all-time seroconversion rate of
0.0067% over the course of eight years. Had Alabama's seroconversion rate
been similar to Illinois', approximately five inmates per year would have
contracted HIV while housed in the Limestone Correctional 
Facility. 158
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS MADE BY PRISONERS IN SEGREGATED
PRISON SYSTEMS
The segregation of HIV-positive prisoners has given rise to a host of
constitutional and civil claims by the segregated prisoners. Innumerable
claims have been made against prison systems by HIV-positive inmates
placed in segregated housing for violations of the First Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right to privacy,
among others. The basis of these claims has been mandatory screening for
HIV, disclosure of screening results, segregated housing, denial of access to
programs in prison and in the community, and inadequate medical care. The
remaining sections of this article will examine claims brought by prisoners
in both integrated and segregated prison systems, and the courts' evaluations
and responses to these claims.
It is well settled that inmates do not give up all of their constitutional
rights upon entering a correctional facility. However, at times, a prisoner's
rights may be lawfully limited or compromised by the correctional
administration. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court combined several
principles established in prior decisions to create a four prong test to
determine if a particular action or practice of a correctional staff or
administration violates the constitutional rights of prisoners. In Turner v.
Safely, 159 the Court analyzed a claim brought by a group of prisoners that
regulations imposed by the Missouri Division of Corrections, restricting
correspondence among inmates and the marriage of inmates violated their
constitutional rights.
157. Id. at 1294.
158. Id.
159. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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The rule restricting correspondence only allowed written correspondence
between immediate family members who were inmates at different
institutions, and between inmates concerning legal matters, but allowed
other forms of inmate correspondence only if the inmate's
classification/treatment team deemed it in the best interest of the parties.
60
This regulation was imposed by the prison administration to further security
interests, as mail between prisons may be used to communicate escape plans,
to arrange violent acts, and to foster prison gang activity.
The rule restricting marriage of inmates prohibited inmates from marrying
other inmates or civilians unless the prison superintendent determined that
there were compelling reasons for marriage.' 6 1 According to testimony,
typically the only sufficiently compelling reason would be a pregnancy or
the birth of an illegitimate child. The Court held that when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
163
As part of its holding, the Court set forth the following four factors,
relevant in determining the reasonableness of the regulation in question.
"First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental issue put forward to justify it.
' 164
The next consideration is whether inmates have access to alternative means
of exercising the asserted right. 165 The third factor is the impact that the
accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards, other inmates, and
on the allocation of prison resources in general.i6  The final factor is the
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After evaluating the challenged regulations in light of the relevant factors,
the Turner Court determined that the Missouri rule restricting written
correspondence among inmates was constitutional because it was reasonably
related to legitimate security interests, it only barred inmate communication
with a limited class of other people, the safety of other inmates and prison
personnel could be threatened by written communication among inmates
from different facilities, and there were no obvious, easy alternatives to the
challenged regulation.' However, the Court found that the restriction of
inmates from marrying unless the prison superintendent approved violated
the prisoners' constitutional right to marriage under Zablocki v. Redhail,
169
as the restriction was not reasonably related to any penological objective,
and there were easy, obvious alternatives to the regulation that would
accommodate the right to marry while imposing only minimal burden on
security objectives.
Although Turner did not address any issues of HIV status, courts have
used its analysis to analyze claims that prisoners' rights have been violated
by the mandatory screening for HIV, involuntary disclosure of screening
results, segregated housing, denial of access to programs in prison and in the
community, and inadequate medical care.171
A. Involuntary Disclosure of HiV Status
Courts have acknowledged that there are "few matters of a more personal
nature" than the manner in which a person reveals his or her HIV diagnosis
to others.1 72 The decision to disclose one's HIV status is an "emotional and
sensitive" one, 173 as the consequences of disclosure may be devastating. In
the context of personal relationships, family members may abandon the
infected individual, or be emotionally unable to cope with the news.1 74 In
the confines of a prison, HIV-positive inmates are likely to suffer
168. Id.
169. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
170. Id.
171. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).




279 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXIV:251
harassment. 175 Outside of prison, persons suffering from AIDS or HIV are
often subject to discrimination. 1 6 Ignorance and prejudice about the disease
are widespread, and the decision of whether, when, or how to disclose HIV
status is an extremely private one, and of great import.
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court established that citizens have a
constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.177 It was in this
opinion that Justice Douglas made his famous statement that penumbras
emanate from specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, and create zones of
privacy. Although this decision was made in the context of a married
couple's right to use contraceptives, the Court has expanded the right to
privacy in its subsequent decisions. 178 In Whalen v. Roe, 179 the Court
acknowledged that its privacy jurisprudence delineates at least two different
kinds of privacy interests. "One is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matter, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."' 180 Further, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its position "that the constitutional right to privacy embraces the
'individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"'1 '" in Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services. 82
Numerous federal courts have acknowledged that the disclosure of a
person's HIV status implicates both types of privacy interests.183 However,
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
179. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977).
180. Id. at 599-600.
181. James F. Homer, Jr., Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Mass Testing and
Segregation of HIV-Infected Inmates, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 369 (1993).
182. Nixon v. Adm'r. ofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
183. See, e.g., Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990); Faison v.
Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3rd
Cir. 2001); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875 (W.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd without
published opinion 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990).
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courts have disagreed on whether the involuntary disclosure of a prisoner's
HIV-positive status violates that specific prisoner's constitutional right of
privacy. The silence of the Supreme Court with respect to this particular
issue has left the circuit and district courts without clear direction, resulting
in a marked lack of consensus among the lower federal courts.
Since its decision in 1987, many federal courts have used the Turner v.
Safely 1 4 analysis to determine if the involuntary disclosure of a prisoner's
HIV status violates their constitutional right of privacy. In 1991, two federal
courts evaluated this issue using the Turner analysis, and arrived at opposite
conclusions. In Harris v. Thigpen,185 the Eleventh Circuit evaluated a claim
brought on the part of prisoners alleging that the Alabama Department of
Corrections' policy of segregating all inmates who tested positive for HIV
resulted in an unnecessary, gravely stigmatizing, and nonconsensual
disclosure of the prisoners' HIV status, which violated their constitutionally
guaranteed privacy rights. 186 The court began its discussion of the issue by
acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "convicted
prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their
conviction and confinement in prison,"' 8 7 and that "[p]rison walls do not
separate inmates from their constitutional rights."' 8 The court even
recognized that prison inmates retain certain fundamental rights of
privacy, 1s 9 but asserted that a prisoner retains only those rights that are
consistent with his/her status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
interests of the corrective system. 19 With a level of commitment that was
later subject to differing interpretations, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "We
nevertheless believe and assume arguendo that seropositive prisoners enjoy
some significant constitutionally-protected privacy interest in preventing the
184. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
185. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1991).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1512 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
188. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. 78).
189. Id. at 1513 (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978)).
190. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citing Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. at 822).
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non-consensual disclosure of their HIV-positive diagnoses to other inmates,
as well as to their families and other outside visitors to the facilities in
question."''9
In evaluating the plaintiffs' claim, the court balanced the limited privacy
interests of the plaintiff prisoners against the interests of the Alabama
Department of Corrections in segregating the plaintiffs, using the four prong
analyses that had been set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner v.
Safely.192 The results of the court's analysis were as follows: 1) segregation
was connected to the legitimate goals of reducing HIV transmission and
violence within the state's penal system, 193 2) the accommodation of the
privacy rights of the plaintiff prisoners by reintegrating them in to the
general population would have a severe impact on fellow inmates and
guards, as it posed a realistic threat of violence from an intervening group of
seronegative inmates, who vehemently opposed the reintegration of
seropositive inmates, 194 and 3) although the alternative to the challenged
regulation-mainstreaming HIV-positive inmates and implementing
educational programs-was available and widely practiced among other
prison systems, it was reasonably rejected by the Alabama prison
administration because of reasonable fears that greater harm would result.
195
With respect to the remaining prong of the Turner test, whether the inmates
have an alternative means of exercising the asserted right, the court bluntly
acknowledged that there were no alternative means of protecting the
inmates' right of privacy, as "disclosure of one's HIV status either occurs or
it does not."' 9 6 The court abruptly dismissed this concern by declaring that
the involuntary disclosure of one's HIV status was an inevitable by-product
of Alabama's "identify and isolate policy."' 97 Apparently untroubled by the
fact that this prong of the Turner test remained unsatisfied, the court held
that the challenged regulation was valid because it was reasonably related to
191. Id. at 1513 (emphasis original).
192. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
193. See Harris, 941 F.2dat 1517.
194. Id. at 1518.
195. Id. at 1519.
196. Id. at 1517.
197. Id.
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legitimate penological interests and, therefore, was not a violation of the
plaintiff inmates' constitutional fight of privacy.
Several weeks after the Eleventh Circuit decided Harris v. Thigpen,'98 a
federal district court in New York heard a similar case, and declined to
follow the ruling of Harris. In Nolley v. County of Erie, corrections staff
placed red stickers on the plaintiff prisoner's documents and possessions,
thus revealing her HIV-positive status to non-medical staff and fellow
inmates. 199 Because of her HIV-positive status, the plaintiff was also
removed from the general population and placed in segregated housing with
inmates who were psychologically unstable or carried infectious blood-
borne diseases. 200 The plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the
placement of red stickers and her segregation from the general population
resulted in an involuntary disclosure of her HIV-positive status in violation
of her constitutional right of privacy. 20 1 The court began its analysis of her
claim by acknowledging that prison inmates have a constitutional right of
privacy that protects them from the unwarranted disclosure of their HIV
status.2 In doing so, the court mentioned a series of federal cases that have
upheld this right,2° 3 and dismissed the few cases that refused to recognize
this right as "not compelling." 20 4 The court went on to apply the analysis set
forth in Turner v. Safely in order to determine whether this particular
disclosure of HIV status was reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.
The court determined that although the correctional administration had a
legitimate interest in protecting the staff from infection, the placement of red
stickers on the plaintiffs documents and possessions was not reasonably
related to this interest. The practice of universal precautions, already
implemented at this facility, was a more reliable method of preventing
infection. This is because a number of inmates who carried infectious
198. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1495.
199. Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 717 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 731.
203. Id. at 730-31.
204. Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 731 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
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diseases were unknown to the staff. Additionally, the universal precautions
were exactly the same as those enumerated on red stickers. As a result, the
court concluded that the red stickers were an "exaggerated response" to
prison concerns, that the red stickers did nothing to further the protection of
the staff from blood borne infection, and that universal precautions were a
"notably superior" alternative. 205 The court also conceded that there was no
alternative means for the plaintiff to exercise the right of privacy, as "[o]nce
it is lost, it is lost forever." 20 6 Accordingly, the court found that the
disclosure of the plaintiffs HIV status through the placement of red stickers
on her documents and possessions was a violation of her constitutional right
of privacy.
The Nolley court also determined that the removal of the plaintiff from the
general population and her subsequent placement in segregated housing
resulted in the involuntary disclosure of her HIV status. In determining
whether this disclosure violated the plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy,
the court again applied the Turner analysis to evaluate whether the
segregation of HIV-positive inmates was rationally related to the legitimate
purpose of protecting inmates in the general population from exposure to the
virus. The court found that the segregation was not rationally related to the
protection of inmates in the general population. The segregation involved
placing the plaintiff among HIV-negative inmates who were emotionally
unstable and engaged in behavior that made it more likely that the virus
would be accidentally transmitted. Additionally, the policy of separating
only inmates known to be infected with HIV did very little to protect the
general population because there were a number of inmates who were likely
HIV-positive, but whose HIV status remained unknown.
The court noted that HIV-positive status alone is not enough to constitute
a threat of transmission to other inmates. Rather, it is the behavior of an
inmate toward other inmates that carries the risk of HIV transmission. A
facility's "decision to segregate only on the basis of an inmate's HIV status,
without regard to their [sic] behavior, while it may slightly reduce the
possibility of accidental HIV transmission, does not seriously further that
,,207goal. The court also found that the automatic segregation of HIV-
positive inmates was an exaggerated response because the correctional
facility already had a written policy stating that inmates would not be
segregated based upon HIV status alone and that other factors would be
considered, such as medical needs and disruptive or threatening behavior.
205. Id. at 733.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 736.
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The contrast between the opinions of the Eleventh Circuit in Harris and
the district court in Nolley is striking. Although Harris was decided by a
court of higher authority and has since been followed, 20 the district court's
reasoning in Nolley is more sound and more faithful to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Turner v. Safely. In Nolley, the court painstakingly ensured that
each prong of the Turner test was analyzed and satisfied. Harris, on the
other hand, failed to give adequate consideration to two of the four prongs,
specifically, the existence of alternative means for inmates to exercise the
asserted right (there are none), and the presence or absence of ready
alternatives to the challenged regulation (there are many). Additionally,
Nolley's preference of universal precautions over the disclosure and
segregation of those known to be HIV positive in prisons was sensible.
Universal precautions are recommended by the NCCHC 2° 9 and are a more
effective means of achieving the penological interest in preventing the
accidental transmission of HIV than the mass testing and segregation upheld
by Harris. Even in systems where all inmates are screened for HIV, the
incidence of false negative test results and the "window" period between
infection and detection will likely result in several cases of HIV that remain
unknown to prison personnel. Most importantly, as stated by the district
court in Nolley, it is the behavior of an inmate toward other inmates rather
than the inmate's HIV status that carries the likelihood of accidental
transmission.
210
The court's decision in Nolley is consistent with numerous other decisions
within the Second Circuit. For example, in 1988, Doe v. Coughlin held
that the involuntary segregation of prisoners based upon their HIV-positive
status violated their constitutional right of privacy, and in 1989, Rodriguez v.
Coughlin 212 held that a prisoner being transported in a "hygiene suit" due to
his HIV status had a valid constitutional claim on right to privacy grounds
because the suit revealed his HIV status to fellow inmates, who threatened
him with bodily harm. In 1999, the Second Circuit held that a prisoner has a
constitutional right of privacy with respect to his or her transgender status
208. E.g., Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1992); Onishea v. Hopper,
171 F.3d 1289, 1301-02 (11 th Cir. 1999).
209. NCCHC, supra note 86.
210. Nolley, 776 F. Supp. at 736.
211. Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
212. Rodriguez v. Coughlin, No. CIV-87-1577E, 1989 WL 59607, at *1-3 (W.D.N.Y.
June 5, 1989).
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and HIV status.21 3 Other jurisdictions have agreed with this position of the
Second Circuit. For example, the Tenth Circuit,2 14 the Ninth Circuit, 2 15 and
courts within Third 216 and Seventh 2 17 Circuits have all recognized that
inmates have a constitutional right of privacy with respect to their HIV
status.
Notwithstanding the position of the many courts mentioned above, there
are a number of courts that refuse to acknowledge any constitutional right of
privacy with respect to medical information. For example, in Doe v.
218
Wiggington, the Sixth Circuit denied the defendant's claim that the
disclosure of his HIV status to corrections officers violated his constitutional
right to privacy. The court held that individuals do not have a constitutional
right to privacy that includes a right of nondisclosure of private information.
The court rejected the idea that Whalen v. Roe and Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services established a constitutional right of nondisclosure, and
stated that only "isolated statements" when "read out of context" would lend
some support to such a claim.2 19 In its decision, the court cited one previous
decision that also refused to recognize a constitutional right of
nondisclosure, 22 albeit in the very different context of the dissemination of
juvenile delinquents' societal histories to the courts where they were being22!
adjudicated. The court ultimately opined that not all privacy interests are
"of constitutional dimension." Similarly, in Adams v. Drew,2 22 the District
213. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 1999).
214. E.g., A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994).
215. E.g., Hilaire v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., No. 90-15344, 1991 WL 90001, at *2 (9th
Cir. May 30, 1991).
216. E.g., Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Albrecht v. Lehman,
No. CIV.A.93-0318, 1993 WL 346216, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1993).
217. E.g., Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
218. Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1994).
219. Id. at 740.
220. Id. at 740 (citing J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089-90 (4th Cir. 1981)).
221. J.P., 653 F.2d at 1091.
222. Adams v. Drew, 906 F. Supp 1050, 1057 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to "discover" new
constitutional rights regarding privacy, after discussing the divided judicial
landscape and lack of direction from the Supreme Court about the issue.
Other jurisdictions have tenuously recognized that such a right may exist,
but deny that the right has been "clearly established." For example, in Tokar
v. Armontrout, 223 the Eighth Circuit held that there was no clearly
established right of confidentiality in medical records for prisoners. The
court noted that there was no Supreme Court case or appellate holding
granting such a right to prisoners, stating that the closest case was Harris v.
Thigpen. The court focused on the Eleventh Circuit's statement in Harris
that the right of privacy with respect to medical information was "rather ill-
defined," but for purposes of the opinion the court assumed a privacy right
224existed. The Eighth Circuit and other courts have construed this portion
of Harris as a failure to clearly establish a constitutional right of privacy in
one's HIV status. 225 These courts have also taken the position that courts
that have unequivocally recognized a constitutional right to privacy in
medical information, such as the district courts within the Second Circuit or
the Seventh Circuit, lack the necessary status to "clearly establish" a
constitutional right.
226
The viewpoint that there is no clearly established right of privacy for
prisoners with respect to medical information has led to a trend among
federal courts of denying plaintiff prisoners' claims that their constitutional
right to privacy has been violated through the nonconsensual disclosure of
their HIV status by granting qualified immunity to the defendant prison staff
members. The doctrine of qualified immunity "shields government officials
from liability for damages on account of their performance of discretionary
official functions 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."' 227 The vast majority of defendants in these types of
cases are granted governmental immunity, even in the Second Circuit. The
223. Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 1996).
224. Id. (citing Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1512-13 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
225. Id. (citing Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 1995)).
226. Tokar, 97 F.3d at 184 n.9 ("In any event, 'district court decisions cannot clearly
establish a constitutional right."' (quoting Anderson, 72 F.3d at 524)).
227. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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most recent court to address this issue is the court that heard Doe v.
228Magnusson in 2005. In Doe, the plaintiff prisoner claimed that his
constitutional right of privacy had been violated when corrections officers
removed his HIV medication from a private location in his cell and placed it
in an area where it was visible to correctional staff and other inmates, thus
disclosing the fact that he was HIV-positive. In an unreported decision, a
federal district court in Maine concluded that there is a "Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy that protects private medical information from
unjustified disclosure by governmental actors."229 However, in keeping with
the current federal judicial trend, the court explained that this right to
privacy was not clearly established at the time the alleged violation took
place, and granted governmental immunity to the defendant correctional
officers, dismissing the claim.
230
The U.S. Supreme Court has never evaluated a claim that the involuntary
disclosure of a prisoner's HIV status violates the constitutional right of
privacy. The only two occasions wherein the Supreme Court considered the
rights of an HIV-positive prisoner were in Farmer v. Brennan, and Davis v.
Hopper. In Farmer, the Court held that corrections staff showed deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff prisoner's medical needs, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. In Davis, 232 the plaintiffs claimed that the
segregation of HIV-positive inmates in Alabama's Correctional facilities
violated their rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.233 The
plaintiffs did not raise privacy or any other constitutional claims. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, upholding the Eleventh Circuit's decision
that the segregation of HIV-positive prisoners did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act.
2 34
228. Doe v. Magnusson, No. CIV.04-130-B-W, 2005 WL 758454, at *1 (D. Me. Mar.
21,2005).
229. Id. at *10.
230. Id. at *11.
231. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1970).
232. Onishea v. Hooper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1289 (11 th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom.
Davis v. Hopper 528 U.S. 1114 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
233. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1300-01.
234. Davis, supra note 232.
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B. Due Process
A claim often made by prisoners who have been segregated because of
their HIV-positive status is that the segregation from the general prison
population violates their right to due process. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." 235 It is the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment that is arguably compromised by the administrative segregation
of HIV-positive prisoners, and its "consequent lack of social, recreational,
236and rehabilitative opportunities" for the prisoners. Although the United
States Supreme Court has never addressed this specific issue, in Meachum v.
Fano,237 the Court held that the Due Process Clause, in itself, does not
protect a duly convicted prisoner against a transfer from a medium security
prison to a maximum security person where life is much more disagreeable.
Similarly, in Hewitt v. Helms, 23 the Court held that a prison inmate does not
have a federal constitutional right to be placed in the general prison
population. In keeping with this principle, the majority view among federal
courts is that the administrative segregation of HIV-positive inmates in a jail
or prison does not violate the inmate's right to due process, as long as such
segregation is within the contemplation of terms of the prisoners' original
sentences.
239
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government
from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments on prisoners. 24 Although it
was ratified in 1791, the Eighth Amendment was not interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court until 1890 in In Re Kemmler.241 The Court explicitly stated
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited punishments that involve torture,
235. U.S. Const. amend XIV.
236. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
237. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
238. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 461, 470-71 (1983).
239. See Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 10.
240. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
241. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890).
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lingering death, or mutilation of the body. 24 2 Twenty years later, the Court
held that punishments grossly disproportionate to the committed offense also
violate the Eighth Amendment. 243 For the next several decades, the Court
exercised judicial restraint with respect to the constitutional claims of
prisoners and generally avoided interfering with the problems of prison
administration. This inactivity was likely premised on the belief
expressed in an opinion written by Justice Powell that the "courts are ill-
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform."
245
In the mid "1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts began to scrutinize prison administration more closely to rid the
prisons of inhumane conditions that were regarded as cruel and unusual
punishment. ' 246 In 1976, the Court expanded its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit punishments that involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain. 247 Later that year, in the case of Estelle v.
Gamble, 2 4 the Court acknowledged that at times, the circumstances of a
punishment, including the inadequacy of the medical care provided in
prison, may violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court in Gamble held that
in order for a prisoner to succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim based upon
inadequate medical care, he or she must establish that the supervising prison
officials showed "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's serious medical
needs. 249 The court explained that neither mere negligence, nor theinadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, nor ordinary medical
242. Id. at 446-47.
243. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 992 (citing Weems v. United States 217
U.S. 349 (1910)).
244. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1986); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) (overruled on other grounds).
245. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405.
246. Siegal, supra note 41, at 1553.
247. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
248. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
249. See id at 104-05.
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malpractice violates the Eighth Amendment unless the act or omission was
the result of the deliberate indifference of the responsible officials. °
Although the basis of the prisoner's claim in Gamble was that he was
denied adequate medical care, the "deliberate indifference" standard created
in this opinion was subsequently used by courts to evaluate Eighth
Amendment claims based upon other factual scenarios, such as squalid
living conditions, 251 sexual violence, 252 and excessive exposure to
secondhand smoke.253
The deliberate indifference standard created by Gamble was subsequently
developed by the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman,254 Wilson v. Seiter,255 and
then Farmer v. Brennan. 256 In these cases, the Court extended the
"deliberate indifference" standard to cases involving claims other than
inadequate medical care, such as crowding, squalid living conditions, and
unsafe conditions due to the violence of other inmates.
Rhodes v. Chapman established that a deprivation suffered by a prisoner
during confinement had to be sufficiently serious in order to violate the
Eighth Amendment. 25 Decided in 1981, Chapman evaluated the claim of a
prisoner that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by an Ohio
prison's policy of "double ceiling," or housing two inmates in one cell.
258
The Court denied the claim, holding that in order for a prisoner to be
successful in an Eighth Amendment challenge of prison conditions, he or
250. See id at 105-06.
251. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824-25 (4th Cir. 1991) (summary
judgment by district court reversed; case remanded for further consideration of plaintiffs
claim); Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 422-28 (3d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff's claim granted).
252. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (plaintiffs claim granted); LaMarca
v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1533-39 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs claim granted).
253. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (plaintiffs claim granted).
254. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
255. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
256. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
257. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337.
258. Id.
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she had to establish that the conditions of imprisonment deprived inmates of
their "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." 259 In its opinion, the
Court stated that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and
that no static test can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of
confinement are cruel and unusual,2 6° for the Eighth Amendment must draw
its meaning from "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.
261
Ten years later, the Court decided Wilson v. Seiter,262 which evaluated the
claim that an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights were violated by various
conditions of his confinement, including overcrowding, excessive noise,
inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and
inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities, and housing with mentally
and physically ill inmates. The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's
order affirming summary judgment, and remanded the case for further. .. . . 263
consideration of the plaintiffs claim. In its opinion, the Court established
that an evaluation of an Eighth Amendment prison claim had two
components: an objective one and a subjective one. The objective
component asks whether the deprivation alleged by the inmate is sufficiently
serious to violate the Eighth Amendment: Was the inmate deprived of the
minimal civilized measure of life 's necessities?264 The subjective component
inquires into whether the corrections official acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind: Did the corrections official act or fail to act with
deliberate indifference to the needs of the prisoner?2 65 The Court failed to
clearly define deliberate indifference, other than by referring to Estelle v.
Gamble, where the court merely explained that it was a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence.
26 6
259. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
260. Id. at 822.
261. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
262. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991).
263. Id.
264. See id. at 298 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
265. See id. at 298-303.
266. See id. at 302-03; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
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Shortly after the Court decided Wilson, the decision was criticized by at
least one commentator, who argued that the subjective standard set forth in
Wilson places too much of a burden on inmates who attempt to establish that
the conditions of their confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. This is
particularly true, the critic asserted, when an inmate alleges that a prison
official's failure to stop prison rape comprises cruel and unusual
punishment. The critic refers to Wilson's subjective standard as an
"insurmountable barrier" to a successful claim, and declares that the
subjective prong of the Wilson v. Seiter analysis may be "too inflexible to
respond adequately to the potentially life threatening danger posed by the
combined situation" of prison rape and AIDS.26 7
Another difficulty presented by Wilson was its failure to clearly define
deliberate indifference. Without a clear definition, lower courts often
interpreted deliberate indifference as recklessness. This led to disagreement
among the lower courts, as recklessness is defined differently by different
bodies of law. Civil law defines a reckless person as one who acts or fails to
act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so
obvious that it should be known. Criminal law, on the other hand,
generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a
risk of harm of which he is aware. 269 The disparity between the civil and
criminal theories of recklessness gave rise to predictable inconsistencies in
270the lower courts. For example, in McGill v. Duckworth, the Seventh
Circuit held that "deliberate indifference" requires a subjective standard of
recklessness. Under this standard, the prison official has actual knowledge
of the risk of harm to inmates. Six months later, in Young v. Quinlan,27 1 the
Third Circuit adopted the objective standard. Under this standard, a "prison
official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or should have known of a
sufficiently serious danger to an inmate."
272
267. Siegal, supra note 41, at 1556.
268. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1984) (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 34 at 213-14 (5th ed. 1984);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)).
269. Id. at 836-37 (citing R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 850-51 (3d ed.
1982)).
270. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991).
271. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3rd Cir. 1992).
272. Id. (emphasis omitted).
2008]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXIV:251
The Supreme Court resolved theses differences in 1994, when it clearly
defined "deliberate indifference" in Farmer v. Brennan.273 Prior to this
decision, however, lower courts evaluated numerous claims that inmates'
potential exposure to HIV were in violation of the Eighth Amendment using
Wilson as their guideline.
A. Eighth Amendment Claims of Prisoners in Integrated Prison Systems
The prevalence of HIV in prisons combined with the high incidence of
risk behavior and absence of prevention measures have led to a multitude of
claims by prisoners asserting that their rights under the Eighth Amendment
have been violated by the potential exposure to HIV while in custody. By
1991, the Supreme Court had established that the Eighth Amendment
requires prison officials to provide adequate medical care,274 the "minimal
civilized measures of life's necessities, ' 275 and to "take reasonable measures
to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves." 276 The Eighth
Amendment therefore compels prison officials to take reasonable steps to
protect inmates from contracting communicable diseases from other inmates
when the failure to do so reflects the "deliberate indifference to serious
,,277medical needs.. The Eighth Amendment's requirement that corrections
officials "take reasonable measures to guarantee safety of the inmates
'278
279includes protecting them from harm at the hands of other inmates and
from self-inflicted harm. 28 Although claims involving exposure to HIV in
prison often implicate both the right to adequate medical care and the right
273. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
274. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976).
275. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
276. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984).
277. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106).
278. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Palmer, 468 U.S. at 526-27).
279. Id. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558
(1st Cir. 1988)); see also Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).
280. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d. 1117, 1121 (4th Cir. 1981); see generally De'Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003).
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to safety, the vast majority of these claims have been denied. In 1993, the
Supreme Court decided Helling v. McKinney, holding that a prisoner may
have a claim under the Eighth Amendment if prison officials, acting with
deliberate indifference, expose a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial "risk of
serious damage to his future health." 28' Although the factual basis of the
claim in Helling was that a prisoner was exposed to secondhand smoke, this
decision is relevant to cases involving the transmission of HIV in prison
because the Court acknowledged that exposure to serious contagious disease
may also violate the Eighth Amendment if corrections officials acted or
failed to act with deliberate indifference to the risk of the inmate's health or
safety.
282
This dictum was referenced in a number of cases involving the potential
exposure to HIV, including Glick v. Henderson,283 which determined that
prison's failure to segregate inmates with HIV/AIDS did not violate the
Eighth Amendment based upon the recommendation of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services that HIV is not spread through casual contact.
Later, in Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,28 4 inmate Melvin Deutsch
claimed that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated when he was
housed with an HIV-positive cellmate and not notified of his cellmate's HIV
status. The district court rejected Deutsch's claim, stating that he failed to
establish that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to Deutsch's
serious medical needs. 285 The court considered the HIV-related policies of
the corrections facility, which included the screening of new inmates for
HIV and counseling for those who were HIV positive. The court also
considered the policies of prohibiting conduct known to transmit the virus,
such as sexual contact and needle sharing, and the removing of HIV-positive
inmates from the general prison population when there was reliable evidence
that their conduct may pose a health risk to other inmates.286 The court also
highlighted the fact that Deutsch had not claimed that any of the prison
officials had specific knowledge that the cellmate might engage in conduct
281. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
282. Id. at 32-33; see also Lareau, 651 F.2d at 109 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
283. Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 1988).
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that would expose Deutsch to a high risk of contracting AIDS or that they
had tacitly condoned or allowed this conduct to occur. 7 Deutsch was
subsequently cited by numerous courts in other jurisdictions.
288
In 1994, the Supreme Court made significant strides in Eighth
289
Amendment jurisprudence when it decided Farmer v. Brennan. In
Farmer, the Court explicitly defined deliberate indifference in its evaluation
of the Eighth Amendment claim of a transsexual inmate who was raped in
prison and allegedly contracted HIV during the attack.290 The district court
had denied the plaintiff's claim, holding that prison officials had no actual
knowledge of danger to the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not express any
safety concerns to them. 291 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling,292 but the Supreme Court vacated their decisions, finding that the
district court erred in placing decisive weight on the plaintiff prisoner's
failure to notify prison staff of a danger. 293 In its decision, the Court held
that a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement only if the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the inmate's health 294 or
safety.295 The Court emphasized that "the official must both be aware of the
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 1519, 1524 (N.D. Ala. 1993);
Marcussen v. Brandstat, 836 F. Supp. 624, 628 (N.D. Iowa 1993); Martin v. Vaughn,
1995 WL 458977, *2 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Portee v. Tollison, 753 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.S.C.
1990); Goss v. Sullivan, 839 F. Supp. 1532, 1536 (D. Wyo. 1993); Bolton v. Goord, 992
F. Supp. 604, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
289. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
290. Id. at 837.
291. Id. at 831-32.
292. Id. at 832.
293. Id. at 848-49.
294. Siegal, supra note 41, at 1541.
295. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. 296 The Court also
stated that the "Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
'conditions;' it outlaws cruel and unusual 'punishments."' ' 297 Under this
ruling, an inhumane prison condition does not become an inhumane
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment unless and until a
corrections official becomes aware of the inhumane condition and fails to
respond reasonably to it.
The standard set forth in Farmer is an objective standard, consistent with
the criminal definition of recklessness. As such, an inmate is required to
prove that corrections officials had actual knowledge of a substantial risk to
the inmate's safety or health in order to establish a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of this
standard, explaining that a prisoner need not establish that the prison
officials were actually notified of the danger. Rather, the Court explained,
"requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to
demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial
evidence,... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.
298
Farmer's standard of requisite knowledge, allowing a factfinder to draw
an inference of knowledge from an obvious risk of serious harm weakens the
"insurmountable barrier ' 299 created by Wilson. This broad interpretation of
subjective knowledge charges corrections officials with awareness of
obvious prison conditions and does not allow prison officials to insulate
themselves from liability for failing to protect an inmate by intentionally
turning a blind eye or a deaf ear to harmful prison conditions. Under
Farmer, corrections officials will no longer be able to hide behind claims
that because they had not been notified about a particular risk, they were
unaware of it. The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has
delineated two separate rights of prisoners relevant to the transmission of
HIV in prison: the right to be protected from harm, and the right to be
provided with adequate medical care.
296. Id. at 837.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 842.
299. Siegal, supra note 41, at 1556.
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B. Reasonable Measures to Protect Inmates from Harm Include the
Distribution of Prophylactic Devices to Prevent the Transmission of HIV in
Prison
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable
measures to protect prisoners from harm.300 Although the threat of rape in
prison, by itself, has not been considered "pervasive" by the courts, the
existence of all types of risk behavior combined can very reasonably be
characterized as "pervasive." As Farmer explained, "it does not matter
whether the risk [of harm] comes from a single source or multiple
sources.
3 °1
When obvious conditions exist in the prison culture, such as the threat of
rape, the commonplace use of intravenous drugs, and regular homosexual
activity among both heterosexual and homosexual prisoners, a factfinder
may, pursuant to the holding of Farmer, infer that a corrections official has
knowledge of a substantial risk of HIV transmission among prisoners. This
applies particularly in prison systems that neither segregate their HIV-
positive population, nor permit the distribution of bleach kits, sterile needles,
or barrier devices such as condoms or dental dams. The substantial risk of
HIV transmission during these widespread and well-known prison behaviors
poses a serious risk to inmates, about which prison officials may not be
deliberately indifferent any longer.
30
2
A reasonable measure of protection from this particular source of harm is
the distribution of prophylactic devices, such as condoms, dental dams, and
sterile needles or bleach kits to avert the risk of HIV transmission among
prisoners engaging in risky behavior. A corrections official's failure to
distribute such prophylactic devices when high-risk behaviors are inevitably
and obviously occurring may violate the Eighth Amendment. If a prisoner
has a substantial risk of contracting HIV due to commonplace activities in
the prison, and corrections officers know about the high-risk situation and do
nothing to lower that risk, the prisoner may have a claim under the Eighth
Amendment.
Two obvious arguments will be made against this position. The first and
most obvious argument is that the corrections officials are not exposing the
inmates to the risk of HIV; the inmates are exposing themselves. Therefore,
the holdings of Farmer and Helling do not apply, as they do not specifically
require corrections officers to take reasonable steps to avert a self-imposed
300. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).
301. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.
302. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993).
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risk of harm to an inmate's health or safety. The second argument is that
correctional officials have already taken reasonable measures to prevent the
spread of HIV by prohibiting all types of risk behavior in prison.
The first argument, that the corrections officials are not required to avert a
risk of harm when an inmate exposes himself or herself to the risk, is easily
discredited. Federal courts have held that corrections officials are required
to intervene when inmates are at risk of harm, even when the risks are
created by the inmates themselves. For example, the Eighth Amendment
requires corrections officials to take adequate precautions to prevent an
inmate's suicide.303 Adequate precautions to prevent a suicide may include
increased surveillance, as well as the removal of belts, shoelaces, or other
objects that an inmate may employ to harm himself.30 4 Federal courts have
also held that the Eighth Amendment requires that corrections officials
protect inmates from self-injury, 305 and at least one court has characterized
an inmate's need for protection against continued self-mutilation as a
''serious medical need to which prison officials may not be deliberately
indifferent."' 306 The requirement of corrections officials to take adequate
precautions to prevent the suicide or self-inflicted injury of inmates also
requires corrections officials to take adequate precautions to prevent inmates
from exposing themselves to HIV.
The second argument, that the prohibition of high-risk behavior in prison
is an adequately reasonable measure to protect inmates from the
transmission of HIV, is also easily debunked. The mere prohibition of
conduct that is known to transmit the virus is not an adequate precaution. In
cases involving suicide or self-mutilation by prisoners, it is acknowledged
that the mere prohibition of an activity is not an adequate measure of
prevention, and courts recognize that the Eighth Amendment requires
corrections officials to take additional measures to prevent the self-
303. See Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1992); Hare v. City of
Corinth 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996).
304. See, e.g., Hare, 74 F.3d at 644 ("[A] state jail official might be liable for a
suicide resulting from the official's failure to remove a pair of scissors from the cell of a
pretrial detainee known to be suicidal, even if the state official had otherwise provided
the mentally disturbed detainee with constitutionally sufficient medical care.").
305. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1121 (4th Cir. 1981); see also De'Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that an inmate's self-mutilation
was a serious medical need about which corrections officials could not be deliberately
indifferent).
306. De'Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634.
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destructive behavior by inmates. Thus, it follows that the Eighth
Amendment commands corrections officials to take additional measures,
beyond mere prohibition, to prevent the spread of HIV through obvious
high-risk behavior in prison.
C. Adequate Medical Care Includes the Distribution of Prophylactic
Devices to Prevent HIV Transmission in Prison
The Eighth Amendment's requirement of adequate medical care for
prisoners requires the distribution of prophylactic devices to prevent the
transmission of HIV. 30 7 This argument was asserted by commentator Mark
Parts in 1991, three years before Farmer v. Brennan30 8 was decided. Parts
argues that since "prevention is the only effective means of combating
AIDS, preventive measures are necessary medical care and required by the
eighth amendment [sic]. 3°9
Parts explains that there are two ways of demonstrating that Estelle v.
Gamble's prohibition of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"
may require that preventative measures be made available to inmates at risk
of contracting HIV: first, by showing that the prison doctor is of the opinion
that such measures are medically necessary, and second, by showing that the
opinion of the medical community at large is of the opinion that such
preventative measures are medically necessary.310
According to Parts, if a prison doctor or a doctor who practices outside the
prison has instructed an inmate to use condoms, sterile needles, or other
measures to protect against the transmission of HIV, prison officials will
violate the Eighth Amendment if they refuse to allow the prisoner to comply
with the doctor's orders.311 This is clear from the language in Estelle, which
explicitly prohibits prison officials from "intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed. ' ' 312  Federal courts have established that a
medical need is "serious" if it has been diagnosed by a physician as
307. Parts, supra note 109.
308. Farmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
309. Parts, supra note 109, at 219.
310. Id. at230.
311. Id. at 230-31.
312. Id. at 230 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)).
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requiring treatment, 313 and when prison officials prevent an inmate from
receiving recommended treatment for a serious medical need, they have
acted with deliberate indifference. 314 Parts' other method of demonstrating
that the Eighth Amendment requires the distribution of prophylactic
measures is by showing that the medical community at large is of the
opinion that they are medically necessary to prevent the spread of HIV in
prison. To support this argument, Parts quotes language in Estelle that
"incorporates an extrinsic standard by which an inadequate response to
prisoners' medical needs must be measured. 3 15 Parts rhetorically questions
whether the recommendations of the Surgeon General, American Medical
Association, and World Health Organization for preventative measures are
sufficient to establish the need for preventative care.316 He then points to the
recommendations of numerous healthcare agencies, including the CDC,
World Health Organization, National Commission on AIDS, and the Council
of Europe, all of whom recommend that prisoners be given the means to
prevent HIV transmission.
317
The article continues with the discussion of three "central objections" that
can be raised to against the argument that the Eighth Amendment requires
preventative measures to control the spread of HIV in prison: that
constitutional protections do not apply to preventative medical care, that
constitutional protections do not apply to voluntarily encountered disease
risks, and that constitutional protections are outweighed by the state interest
in regulating high risk activities. 318 Parts begins by asserting that these
objections would not be viable if the preventative medical care at issue was a
vaccine against HIV, rather than condoms, bleach, or sterile needles. Parts
313. Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.
1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd 649 F.2d 860
(3d Cir. 1981)).
314. Id. (quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d
Cir. 1979)).
315. Parts, supra note 109, at 231-32. The language in Estelle quoted by Parts as
providing this extrinsic standard is that "the indifference is manifested by prison doctors
in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
316. Parts, supra note 109, at 232-33.
317. Id. at 234-36.
318. Id. at 237.
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claims that it is a "relatively uncontroversial proposition" that the Eighth
Amendment would require such a vaccine, and "[t]he fact that a prophylactic
device is stuck into the arm rather than worn on the penis is not a difference
of constitutional significance."
31 9
Regarding the potential objection that the Eighth Amendment does not
require preventative medical care, Parts points out that most medical
treatment administered is preventative by nature. 32 For example, painkillers
are administered in advance, tumors are removed before they consume the
body, and vaccinations are administered to prevent disease. 32 1 Additionally,
Parts cites several cases indicating that the Eighth Amendment requires
corrections officials to protect inmates from contracting communicable
diseases from other inmates. 322 This line of cases suggests that Estelle
includes preventative medical care in its requirement of adequate medical
care for prisoners.
The next objection Parts diffuses is that constitutional protections do not
apply to voluntarily encountered risks of disease.3 23 Parts points to cases
which held that corrections officials must treat prisoners who have harmed
themselves and to cases which held that corrections officials have a duty to
take reasonable measures to prevent inmates from committing suicide.
324
Parts then gives a number of hypothetical situations where "it is
inconceivable that courts would deny care for prisoners in the following
situations: a smoking prisoner with lung cancer, an alcoholic prisoner with
cirrhosis, an addicted prisoner with hepatitis caused by a contaminated
needle, a sexually active prisoner with syphilis contracted in prison, or a
prisoner injured in an escape attempt." 32T Since courts would not deny
inmates treatment in those instances, Parts argues neither should they deny
care to those prisoners at risk of contracting HIV. After all, prevention is the
319. Id. at 237-38.
320. Parts, supra note 109, at 238-39.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 239 (citing Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d at 109 (1981); Smith v. Sullivan,
553 F.2d 373, 380 (1977); DeGidio v. Perpich, 612 F. Supp. 1383, 1389-90 (1985)).
323. See id. at 242-45.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 243.
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only form of medical care which averts the risk of exposure to HIV. Parts
also argues that some risk behavior in prison may not be strictly voluntary,
as some behaviors, such as the injection of drugs and sexual intercourse,
may be labeled compulsive.
326
The final potential objection that Parts addresses is that constitutional
protections, providing preventative means, undermine the state interest in
327
regulating high-risk activities. Parts responds to this argument by quoting
Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent in Estelle, that "denial of medical care is
surely not part of the punishment which civilized nations may impose for
crime. ' ' 328 Parts maintains that the distribution of prophylactics does not
prevent prison officials from prohibiting homosexual activity 
or drug use.329
He also comments that preventive measures are necessary because prison
administrations have failed to stop high-risk behavior from occurring in
prisons and it seems "very tenuous to base a state interest on the continued
use of a failing policy. 330
In short, Parts presents a very compelling argument that the Eighth
Amendment's requirement of adequate medical care requires the distribution
of prophylactic devices to protect prisoners from the transmission of HIV.
Parts' conclusion is furthered by a separate argument that evolving standards
of decency command that which is only bolstered by the Court's tendency to
expand the rights of citizens in keeping with changes in our society.
D. Evolving Standards of Decency Require the Distribution of Prophylactic
Devices to Prevent the Transmission of HIV in Prison
In 1958, Chief Justice Warren wrote "[t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.' 33 1 Although he was writing specifically about the Eighth
Amendment, the Court had already embraced this ideology when it
expanded the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
326. Id. at 244-45.
327. See id. at 236-39.
328. Id. at 246-47 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
329. Id. at 248.
330. ld. at 249.
331. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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Brown v. Board of Education.332 In Brown, the Court applied "the evolving
standards of decency that marked the progress of our maturing society," and
struck down the "separate but equal" doctrine that was established in Plessy
v. Ferguson.
333
Similarly, "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
our maturing society" caused the Court to establish a right of privacy for
married couples in 1965, when in Griswold v. Connecticut the court struck
down a law prohibiting the sale of contraceptive devices to married couples.
334 The right of privacy was continually expanded by the court until most
recently, in 2003, the court in Lawrence v. Texas extended the right of
privacy to homosexual couples, allowing them to enjoy sexual relationships
without governmental interference. 335 In these examples, the evolving
standards of decency that marked the progress of our maturing society have
required the Court to overturn previous decisions and expand the protections
offered by different amendments. In both examples, the Court's decisions
were unpopular with a segment of society.
As our society continues to mature and our standards of decency evolve,
the Supreme Court will continue to increase the protections offered to
marginalized populations. Protections offered to prison inmates, by far the
most marginalized of all populations, will also continue to increase.
The Supreme Court laid a foundation in terms of the expanding the
protections of prisoners in Farmer v. Brennan.336 A factfinder can now
draw an inference that corrections officers knew about an inhumane prison
condition if that condition was obvious. 337 Prison officials work among
inmates with HIV and inmates who frequently engage in different types of
high-risk behavior. If the risk of infection is not sufficiently obvious from
the circumstances in the prison, statistical data about the prevalence of HIV
332. See Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
333. See id. (invalidating underlying doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
334. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
335. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the United States Supreme Court
overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which held that the constitutional
right of privacy did not protect consensual homosexual acts.
336. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
337. Id.
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infections and sociological research about the pervasiveness of risky
behavior in prisons is readily accessible. For example, the U.S. Department
of Justice reports that 7.6% of state prisoners in New York are HIV-positive,
as are 4.2% of state prisoners in Maryland and 3.9% in 
Florida. 338
Additionally, sociological studies have revealed that up to 65% of inmates
engage in sexual intercourse339 and 58% of inmates have injected drugs
while in prison. 340 Our evolving standards of decency cannot allow
corrections officials to ignore such information. Likewise, when corrections
officials are confronted with such information, our standards of decency
ought not allow them to refuse to provide life saving measures to those in
their custody and care. To do so would allow corrections officials to show
deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs and safety, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
E. Post Farmer Decisions
Since Farmer, inmates have greater success in their claims that injuries
from prison rape were caused by the deliberate indifference of corrections
officials. 34 1 However, some courts remain reluctant to abide by Farmer's
ruling that corrections officials' knowledge of prison conditions may be
inferred from the fact that such conditions are obvious. The case of Bolton v.
Goord34 2 involved an Eighth Amendment claim based upon a prison's policy
338. Maruschak, Hiv In Prisons, 2003, supra note 1, at 2
339. Christopher P. Krebs, High Risk HIV Transmission Behavior in Prison and the
Prison Subculture, 82 Prison J. 19, 20 (2002) (citing Wayne S. Wooden & Jay Parker,
Men Behind Bars: Sexual Exploitation in Prison (Da Capo Press 1982)).
340. Wayne Gillespie, A Multilevel Model of Drug Abuse Inside Prison, 85 Prison J.
223, 225 (2005) (citing Carl G. Leukefeld & Frank R.Tims, Drug Abuse Treatment in
Prisons and Jails, 10 J. Substance Abuse Treatment 77 (1993)).
341. See, e.g., James v. Tilghman, 194 F.R.D. 408, 419 (D. Conn. 1999) (denying
post-trial motions on grounds that a jury found fault with defendants' continued
placement of a sexual assailant in a celiblock with new inmates, despite strong suggestion
of the assailant's sexual tendencies); Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998)
(upholding the liability of a defendant warden who testified that "inmates had to 'fight'
against sexual aggressors"); Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214-16 (D. Wyo.
2002) (holding defendants liable where an Eighth Amendment "failure to protect" case
arose out of conditions at a prison where inmate-on-inmate assaults were common but
never addressed by prison officials).
342. Bolton v. Goord, 992 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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of double ceiling, and its potential to expose inmates to a serious,
contagious, and infectious disease, such as tuberculosis or HIV. The district
court acknowledged that a prisoner could state an Eighth Amendment claim
for confinement in the same cell as an inmate with a serious contagious
disease that is spread by airborne particles, such as tuberculosis, but rejected
the inmate's claim because he could not establish the deliberate indifference
of corrections officials regarding the spread of infectious disease.343 On the
contrary, the evidence showed that the prison administration was attentive to
the risk of exposure to tuberculosis and HIV, and carefully considered the
health of each inmate before double ceiling. 344 Inmates with active
tuberculosis were not housed in cells with other inmates, and inmates with
HIV were deliberately double celled, based on two rationales. First was the
premise that there was no evidence of the transmission of HIV through
double ceiling. Second was the theory that automatic exclusion of HIV
infected inmates would lead to a false sense of security, and in turn give rise
to more high-risk activity among inmates. 345 Additionally, inmates were
educated on how to protect themselves from the spread of HIV.
3 46
In Bolton, there was no allegation of a dangerous prison condition beyond
the mere presence of a cellmate with HIV. However, in Sosa v. Cleaver,347
inmate Andres Sosa claimed that prison officials violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by double ceiling him with an HIV-positive inmate. Sosa
alleged that he told corrections officials that he was afraid to be in the same
cell with an HIV-positive inmate and that he and the cellmate had had
problems in the past.348 The court denied Sosa's claim, ignoring the ruling
of Farmer, and stated that the plaintiff could not establish the deliberate
indifference of prison officials absent an allegation that the cellmate
threatened to infect him or made recent specific threats of violence, and
corrections officers had notice of such threats. 349 The court cited Goss v.
343. Id. at 626-27.
344. Id. at 614-615, 628.
345. Id. at 628-29.
346. Id. at 629.





Sullivan,350 a pre-Farmer decision, which held that complaints alleging only
a generalized fear of contracting AIDS from an allegedly aggressive HIV-
positive inmate, and containing conclusory allegations that prison officials
were aware of such intentions but did nothing to intervene, were insufficient
to demonstrate the culpable state of mind as required under the Eighth
Amendment. The court's unwillingness to draw an inference of knowledge
in this case, as permitted by Farmer, is perplexing.
Fortunately, the ruling of Farmer has been embraced by Congress. Nine
years after the decision, the 108th Congress passed the Prison Rape
Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA).351 Under PREA, a cause of action may be
brought by victims of prison rape. 352 The PREA mandates training and
education programs for corrections officials, 353 as well as grant money to
state prison systems in order to further assist in their protection of
inmates. 354 Additionally, the PREA requires the U.S. Department of Justice
to collect and analyze data about sexual assaults in federal, state, and local
correctional facilities, and established the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission to study the data, evaluate the responses of prison officials, and
make recommendations for national standards of prison safety.355 Taking
these recommendations into consideration, the Attorney General is to issue
"national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment
of prison rape."
356
350. Id. (citing Goss v. Sullivan, 839 F. Supp. 1532, 1537 (D. Wyo. 1993)).
351. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (2003)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-09).
352. See David K. Ries, Duty-to-Protect Claims by Inmates After the Prison Rape
Elimination Act, 13 J.L. & Pol'y 915, 918 (2005).
The high incidence of sexual assault within prisons involves actual
and potential violations of the United States Constitution. In Farmer
v. Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that deliberate indifference to
the substantial risk of sexual assault violates prisoners' rights under
the Curel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 918, n.21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 15601(13) (2005)).
353. See 42 U.S.C. § 15604(a)(2).
354. See id. § 15605.
355. See id. § 15606.
356. Seeid § 15607.
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F. Inadequate Medical Care
The failure of the corrections administration to provide adequate medical
care has been the basis of numerous claims, as well as a topic of interest in
the media. Typical claims based upon inadequate medical care allege failure
to test or diagnose HIV, 357 failure to disclose HIV-positive status to an
inmate, 35 8 the misdiagnosis of HIV,
3 59 the failure to provide medication,
36 0
and the inadequate services of prison physicians.361 Other claims have been
brought for the failure to provide nutritional supplements362 and appropriate
equipment. 363 In evaluating these claims, the courts have used the deliberate
indifference standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble.364 In Maynard v. New
Jersey,365 the estate of a deceased inmate sued the New Jersey Department
of Corrections on the ground that prison officials failed to diagnose or treat
the decedent's AIDS. The decedent was in the defendant's care for five
months, during which he suffered from numerous symptoms of AIDS.
When the decedent collapsed, the defendant doctor and nurse did not
diagnose the cause, but instead gave him throat lozenges. Eleven days later,
he died of AIDS-related causes. The United States District Court for the
357. See Maynard v. New Jersey, 719 F. Supp. 292 (D.N.J. 1989).
358. See McIlwain v. Prince William Hosp., 774 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Va. 1991).
359. See McDuffie v. Rikers Island Med. Dep't, 668 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Bailey v. Aida Unit-San Quentin State Prison, No. C 95-0071-CAL, 1995 WL 274370
(N.D. Cal. May 3, 1995).
360. See Rivera v. Sheahan, No. 97 C 2735, 1998 WL 53187 (N.D. 111. Aug. 14,
1998).
361. See Macomber v. Davis, No. CIV. A. 92-6112, 1993 WL 79593 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
22, 1993).
362. See Polanco v. Dworzack, 25 F. Supp. 2d 148 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); Holmes v.
Emerson, No. C99-5206 CRBPR, 1999 WL 1285411 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1999).
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District of New Jersey held that the alleged pattern of repeatedly refusing to
provide medical treatment for the decedent's AIDS symptoms, together with
the alleged refusal to treat the decedent after his collapse, if proven,
amounted to a pattern of deliberate indifference.
366
In Mcllwain v. Prince William Hospital,367 the plaintiff prisoner was
tested for HIV during a stay at a local hospital. Although hospital personnel
notified prison medical staff of the inmate's HIV-positive status, the prison
staff neither notified nor treated the inmate. Upon release, the inmate
allegedly infected his wife with the virus. Although it was not determined
whether the prison doctor named in the lawsuit was actually aware of the
inmate's HIV-positive status, the court held that "the knowing failure to
inform a prison patient that he has been exposed to the AIDS virus
constitutes deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners."
368
In McDuffie v. Rikers Island Medical Department,369 the plaintiff prisoner
was diagnosed with Kaposi's sarcoma after two skin biopsies. The
diagnosis was followed by a letter to Riker's Island Medical Department that
the plaintiff was suffering from AIDS. As a result of this letter, the plaintiff
was placed in segregated housing for five months, until a second letter was
sent, which corrected the misdiagnosis and explained that the defendant did
not have AIDS. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that the misdiagnosis of the plaintiff did not constitute
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, especially in light of the
lack of medical knowledge about AIDS in 1982 and that a test for the AIDS
virus was not discovered until 1985. 37 Similarly, in Bailey v. Aida Unit-
San Quentin State Prison,371 the District Court for the Northern District of
California held that a false positive test result for HIV that resulted in the
notification of an inmate that he was HIV-positive and his or her subsequent
placement in segregated housing for seven months did not constitute
deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs.
366. Id. at 295.
N
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370. Id. at 330.
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In Rivera v. Sheahan,372 the plaintiff prisoner notified corrections officials
at the time she was taken into custody that she suffered from AIDS and
needed daily medication. The plaintiff received no treatment for her
condition, even after she started to exhibit symptoms of AIDS. It was not
until she was found comatose in her cell that she was treated for her medical
condition and rushed to a hospital. The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found that the allegations in the complaint, if true, were
almost criminal, and that the complaint alleging defendant's failure to treat
the prisoner's AIDS established deliberate indifference to her serious
medical needs.
373
In Macomber v. Davis,374 the plaintiff prisoner claimed in his allegations
that the treatment he received for AIDS was inadequate and improper. In
denying the defendant's motion for dismissal, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the following circumstances could
constitute deliberate indifference to a prisoners serious medical needs: 1) a
prison doctor's refusal to treat an inmate until hospitalization is required,
allowing AIDS to progress to the point that the inmate is in danger of dying
from what would otherwise be a treatable infection, 2) a prison doctor's
refusal to treat more than one of an inmate's medical problems at a time,
unless due to an exercise of medical judgment, and 3) a prison doctor's
refusal to provide an inmate with pain medication that would allow plaintiff
to take his prescribed AZT.
In Polanco v. Dworzack, the plaintiff prisoner alleged that the
defendant prison staff's refusal to provide him with the name brand
nutritional supplement that he demanded showed deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. The District Court for the Western District of
New York held that the failure of prison personnel to provide the dietary
supplement ENSURE to the plaintiff did not constitute deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, as the defendant's weight was
stable, the prison doctor did not believe it was necessary, and the plaintiff
did receive a daily snack in response to his request. Similarly, in Holmes v.
Emerson,376 the court dismissed the plaintiff prisoner's complaint that the
372. Rivera v. Sheahan, No. 97 C 2735, 1998 WL 53187 (N.D. Il. Aug. 14, 1998).
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prison staff's failure to provide him with a nutritional supplement showed
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
In Hallett v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services,377 the plaintiff
prisoner's claim was based upon the confiscation of his personal wheelchair
by prison personnel and its replacement with a wheelchair that could only be
entered and exited by plaintiff with great difficulty. The prison wheelchair
caused the plaintiff back pain and a fall, which resulted in a head injury.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss this claim, holding that the plaintiff may have
a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Significant reforms must be made in the way the United States approaches
the prevention of HIV in prison. The judiciary, legislature, and corrections
officials must all agree that minimizing the transmission of this deadly virus
in prison is paramount, as 96% of all inmates are released, and a reduction of
HIV transmission in prisons would probably bring about a reduction of HIV
transmission throughout society at large.
While implementing universal precautions for both staff and inmates,
prison systems should integrate their HIV-positive populations, as
segregation is unnecessary and may compromise the rights of HIV-positive
inmates. As suggestions and recommendations of the federal government
have been remarkably ineffective, minimum standards in terms of HIV-
related education for prisoners and the distribution of harm reduction
devices at all correctional facilities should be mandated. All prisoners
should be screened as a prevention measure. Those who are HIV positive
must be counseled as to risky behavior, methods of prevention, partner
notification, and applicable criminal penalties for exposing others to the
disease. Those who are HIV negative must also be educated at an
appropriate level about risky behaviors and how to avoid exposure to the
virus.
The federal government and prison administrations must abandon their
abstract, if not artificial, concerns that the distribution of prevention devices
such as condoms and sterile needles may be interpreted as the condonation
of prohibited risky behavior. Numerous judiciaries, the Department of
Justice, and Congress have acknowledged the high incidence of risky
behavior that, while prohibited, nonetheless occur with great frequency in
prisons. Efforts by the prison administrations to stop this behavior have
been to no avail. The legislative and executive branches have not responded
appropriately, and even so, the courts have been reluctant to compel prison
377. Hallett v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 109 F. Supp. 2d 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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administrations to implement new policies for harm reduction. Rather, the
courts have allowed prison administrations to impose their ignorance, fear,
and "morality" on a marginalized group of human beings given to their
custody and care, denying them protection from a deadly virus. Many
prisoners, who relied on the prison administration to protect them from
harm, now bear the additional burden of being HIV-positive.
The thirty-year-old premise that "courts are ill-equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform" has no
place in the age of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The premise must be rejected.
Courts must interpret the Eighth Amendment to require the distribution of
prophylactic devices to inmates to prevent the transmission of HIV. Such
distribution is necessary to protect the health and safety of the inmates, and
is also regarded by the medical community as a necessary preventative
measure. To deny prisoners access to these simple, life saving tools is to be
deliberately indifferent to their safety and health. This violates the modem
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
